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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates oversight and accountability in the City of 
Johannesburg. The study explores the City of Johannesburg’s new 
governance model as implemented after the 2006 local government 
elections. The study is premised on establishing an understanding of the 
issues that the City of Johannesburg is grappling with since rolling out its 
oversight and accountability model as adopted by its Council in 2006. The 
Constitution of South Africa (1996) vests both the executive and legislative 
authority in the Municipal Council. This is in contrast to other spheres of 
government, namely National and Provincial, whereby there are specific 
chapters on what the Executive, the Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures powers are.  
 
The study begins by discussing the cases of separation of powers in local 
government in the United Kingdom and the City of Johannesburg 
governance model and the rationale behind implementing such a model. 
The study then makes an analysis of the legislative framework in South 
Africa that gives expression to oversight and accountability in government 
broadly. The study discusses its research methodology and the rationale 
for such a methodology in investigating issues that the City of 
Johannesburg is faced with in implementing its oversight and 
accountability model. 
 
In this case study the researcher explores the functionality of the model. In 
doing so, the researcher then proposes ways of ensuring that the 
oversight and accountability could be more effective and whether there are 
any legislative impediments, and then propose to national law makers 
what needs to be done as informed by the research conducted. 
 
 
VII 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Thandekile Mbunge, declare that this research report is my unaided 
work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Masters of Management in Public Management in Public Policy (MM-
PP) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been 
submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other 
University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
....................................................... 
Thandekile Mbunge 
16 October 2015 
VIII 
 
DEDICATION 
 
I would like to thank my wife Vuyokazi and our children for their 
unconditional love, support and understanding throughout the research 
process, I love you, guys. 
 
I would also like to thank my parents, my late father, Mongameli Mbunge 
and my surviving mother Buyiswa Mbunge for always inspiring me to be 
the best person I could ever be in whatever I want to become in life. Thank 
you for believing in me at all times. 
 
IX 
 
                                ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude and 
appreciation to my supervisor, Dr Horácio Zandamela for his support and 
guidance throughout the process of completing this research report. 
 
I would also like to extend my utmost gratitude and appreciation to my 
colleagues and the respondents during the process of data collection and 
finalisation of this research report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 1 - 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research report is based on an exploratory study on the City of 
Johannesburg’s new governance model. The researcher conducted this 
exploratory research on the City of Johannesburg municipality based on 
the new governance model which had been implemented in the 
municipality since the local government term that started in 2006 ending in 
2011. The researcher used a case study approach by focusing on the City 
of Johannesburg model.  
One of the key challenges of the first term of developmental local 
government, beginning in December 2000, was the establishment of an 
entirely new institutional and governance structures. Although pieces of 
legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act (No.32 of 2000) and 
Municipal Structures Act (No.117 of 1998) provided a comprehensive 
outline of the legal architecture of the new democratic local government, 
the translation of these legal precepts into new organisational structures, 
systems and processes required strong political and administrative 
leadership at local level. In the first term of office the South African 
government has pioneered a new and uncharted path towards the 
realisation of a democratic and developmental local state. The White 
Paper on Local Government (1998) clearly spells out government’s 
commitment to build a developmental local government system. 
The end of the first term of developmental local government term of office 
that started in December 2000 and ended in March 2006 provided a 
natural vantage point for reflection on the progress made. Some of the 
lessons learnt meant an opportunity to examine the efficacy of the 
previous local governance models.  The main area of focus was firstly the 
extent to which the municipal councils exercised accountability and 
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oversight over the executive. This is sometimes referred to as the notion of 
the separation of powers between the executive (Mayoral Committee) and 
legislature (Municipal Council) in political governance arrangements.  
Secondly, the issue, is whether enough has been done to ensure the 
accountability of councillors to the citizens. This was based both on the 
experience of the last few years of democratic local government and some 
empirical work done towards the end of the term. The local government 
performance review of the previous term of office, which was conducted 
by the erstwhile Gauteng Department of Local Government (2005), for 
instance, has noted that municipalities were lacking in the culture and 
practice of democratic accountability and thus councillors were quite 
inexperienced in dealing with matters of accountability, but more so on 
issues of financial accountability.  
So these weaknesses structural in nature, meant that when a policy 
decision was taken prior to the 2000 election to create an executive 
mayoral system, not enough attention was paid to what then becomes the 
role of ordinary councillors. With the benefit of hindsight it almost appears 
like this was an incomplete restructuring of the local government system. 
The key issue here being that, in the South African system of local 
government, municipal councils perform a dual role, which means the 
municipal council, is empowered to perform both legislative and executive 
roles.  This is in contrast to national and provincial spheres of governance 
that separate parliament from national government and provincial 
legislatures from provincial government.  
Indeed, local government in other parts of the world, such as the United 
Kingdom had begun to experiment with the separation of powers. This 
practice is premised on the view that the Council’s role should be focused 
on a legislative, oversight and participatory role, and without absolving 
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itself of its executive responsibilities, that it delegates its executive function 
to the executive.  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The City of Johannesburg new governance model is a product of many 
deliberations at the City of Johannesburg’s council (COJ: Mayoral 
Committee: 2006). This is an attempt to respond to the governance 
challenges facing local government. Thus, in accordance with the reforms 
on local governance arrangements in the Gauteng Province, it was agreed 
in the ruling party’s local government forum that City of Johannesburg 
would therefore move, at least on a pilot basis, towards a new governance 
and oversight arrangement that encompasses the separation of powers.  
The main objective was to experiment on how the Gauteng Province, 
through the City of Johannesburg pilot, can strengthen the role of the 
council as a legislature, and enhance its role in oversight and ensuring 
participation. Accordingly, the City of Johannesburg pilot meant a move 
away from the chapter 80 committees (Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act No. 177 of 1998) to Section 79 committees.  
Local government being regarded as a sphere on its own, the Constitution 
(1996) and local government legislation defines and reserves the following 
legislative and certain high-level executive roles for the Council: approval 
of by-laws, policy, the Integrated Development Plan, tariffs for rates and 
service charges and the budget.  In the approach taken, at least in the 
short term, it was decided that these should remain in place not only for 
pragmatic or legal reasons, but because they are the primary areas of 
local government responsibility (COJ: Mayoral Committee: 2006). 
The Gauteng Department of Local Government Performance review 
(2006) of the first term of developmental local government starting from 
2000 to 2005 has, for instance, noted that municipalities were lacking in 
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the culture and practice of democratic accountability. This was largely 
attributed to the fact that most councillors were inexperienced in dealing 
with matters of accountability, especially financial accountability.  
Once again these structural weaknesses could be attributed to the fact 
that when a policy decision was taken prior to the 2000 election to create 
an executive mayoral system, not enough attention was paid to the 
pertinent question of what becomes the role of ordinary councillors as 
articulated in the White Paper on Local Government (1998). With the 
benefit of hindsight, it almost appears like an incomplete restructuring of 
the local government system took place back then in the year 2000.  
The contentious issue here being that in the South African system of local 
government, municipal councils appear to perform a dual role, which is, 
municipal councils are empowered to perform both legislative and 
executive roles. This is in contrast to national and provincial spheres of 
governance where separation between parliament or provincial 
legislatures and Cabinet or Executive council has been clearly spelled out 
in the legislation.  
One of the key challenges of the first term of local government that started 
in December of the year 2000, was the establishment of new institutional 
and governance structures to further enhance oversight and 
accountability, and therefore deepen democracy. Although the introduction 
of pieces of legislation on local government such as the Municipal 
Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) and the Local Government: Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) provides a 
comprehensive outline of the legal architecture of the new democratic 
local government, the translation of these legal precepts into new 
organisational structures, systems and processes require strong political 
and administrative leadership. 
It was during the first term of office that new and uncharted path towards 
the realisation of a democratic and developmental local state was 
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pioneered. The type of local government envisaged was outlined in the 
White Paper on Local Government (1998). This meant the transformation 
of the local government as a distinct and autonomous sphere of 
government continued. 
The subsequent local government term of office that began in early 2006 
provided government with a natural vantage point for reflection on the 
progress made and lessons learned. This further provided a platform to 
examine the efficacy of the previous local governance models of 
governance. The main area of focus in this instance would be to assess 
the extent to which the municipal councils exercise their oversight and 
scrutiny role on the executive, that is, the executive mayors, members of 
mayoral committees, municipal managers and executive directors. This is, 
alternatively, referred to as “the doctrine of separation of powers” between 
the executive and the legislature in political governance arrangements. 
The primary question at this stage is whether enough has been done to 
ensure that the executive becomes accountable to municipal council and 
to communities. 
The City of Johannesburg’s pilot was indeed an attempt to respond to the 
governance challenges facing local government. The researcher therefore 
sought to assess the inception process, including some early signs of 
effectiveness of the new governance and separation of powers model. In 
essence, the City of Johannesburg’s pilot represented a complete attempt 
to move away from the section 80 committees to section 79 oversight 
committees. 
 
1.2 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has been making 
concerted efforts of bringing about a legislative framework that is in line 
with the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic 
of South African, Act 108 of 1996. There has been a lot of progress done 
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in ensuring good governance in the public sector by providing effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government aimed at serving the 
South African public. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996) requires all organs of state to conduct themselves in a manner 
which ensures efficiency and effectiveness when serving the public, but to 
also be transparent, open and accountable when doing so. 
 
This meant that there has to be some kind of a legislative improvement, 
which could mean the amendment of those pieces of legislations that were 
no longer in line with the values and principles of a new democratic South 
Africa. This meant that policy and law makers had to be innovative in the 
manner in which they conceptualised the legislative framework that would 
live up to the values and principles as spelt out in the Constitution. This 
had to be the case to all three spheres of government. 
 
In this chapter the researcher provides an overview of the legislative 
framework within which oversight and accountability mechanisms, such as 
the COJ governance model could function. This will be done through 
discussing the Constitution as it sets out the basis for oversight and 
accountability, and then discuss other pieces of legislation in the three 
spheres of government that have some relevance to the notion of 
oversight and accountability at the sphere of local government. 
 
1.3 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 
Once again, the Constitution (1996) section 1(d) from the onset states 
clearly that accountability, responsiveness and openness as the values 
that South African government should be premised on. Section 41(1) (c) of 
the Constitution requires that all spheres of government and all organs of 
state within each sphere must provide effective, transparent and 
accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole. These 
principles of accountability and transparency are therefore established by 
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the supreme law of the country. 
 
The section 43 of the Constitution (1996) establishes Parliament and 
provincial legislatures as the legislative authorities within the national and 
provincial spheres of government, and the municipal councils as the 
legislative authority within the municipal council. Sections 55 and 114, 
gives legislatures the responsibility of ensuring that all executive organs of 
the state are accountable to the Constitution. This means therefore that 
legislatures are compelled to maintain oversight over the executive arm. 
 
1.4 POWERS, PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES OF PARLIAMENT AND 
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES ACT  
 
The Powers, Privileges, Immunities of Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures Act, No. 4 of 2004 (PPIPPL), expands on the powers that the 
RSA Constitution gives to committees of legislatures. Chapter 5 of the 
PPIPPL provides for the summonsing of 42 witnesses; the examination of 
witnesses; and offences relating to witnesses.  
 
For instance, if an individual who has been summoned to appear in front 
of any municipal committee does not do so when expected to do so and 
place specified in the summons, or who fails fully and reasonably to 
answer all questions lawfully put to him or her, or fails to produce any 
document in his or her possession or custody or under his or her control, 
which he or she has been required to produce, commits an offence. Such 
a person is then liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 12 months or to both the fine and the imprisonment.  
 
This provision also applies to a person who threatens or obstructs another 
person in respect of evidence to be given before a House or committee. 
However, in such a case a penalty for a period of up to two years 
imprisonment is possible.  
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Section 6(3) further provides that evidence given under oath or affirmation 
by a person before a House or committee may not be used against that 
person in any court or place outside Parliament, except in criminal 
proceedings. 
  
The above mentioned provisions are important, for they empower 
committees of the legislatures to carry out informed and unhindered 
oversight, and also provide protection to witnesses who may be afraid of 
giving incriminating evidence. It should be noted though that, these 
powers and privileges do not apply to municipal councils or their 
committees, which results in a lack of clarity regarding the roles, powers 
and functions in relation to municipal council oversight portfolio 
committees as is in the case of COJ. 
  
1.5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT: MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ACT 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998 
provides for the establishment of various categories of municipalities in 
accordance with and for the regulation of the internal systems, structures 
and office bearers of municipalities.  
 
The most relevant sections of the act are those that relate to the 
establishment of the committees of the municipality. According to section 
33 of the Act, a municipality may establish a committee if the 
establishment of the committee is necessary, taking into account the 
extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; the need for the 
delegation of those functions and powers in order to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness in their performance; and the financial and administrative 
resources of the municipality available to support the proposed committee. 
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Sections 79 and 80 create non-executive and executive committees: 
Section 79 committees are non-executive committees that may be 
established for the effective and efficient performance of any of a 
municipal council‘s functions, or the exercise of any of its powers, provided 
that the municipal council determines the functions of a committee and 
delegates duties and powers to it. The council must appoint the 
chairperson, and may authorise a committee to co-opt advisory members 
who are not members of the council within the limits determined by the 
council. The council may also determine a committee‘s procedure.  
 
Section 80 committees are provided for to assist the executive committee 
or executive mayor. If a municipal council has an executive committee or 
executive mayor, it may appoint, in terms of section 79, committees of 
councillors to assist the executive committee or executive mayor. Such 
committees may not in number exceed the number of members of the 
executive committee or mayoral committee. The executive committee or 
executive mayor appoints a chairperson for each committee from the 
executive committee or mayoral committee, and may delegate any powers 
and duties of the executive committee or executive mayor to the 
committee. Section 80 committees must report to the executive committee 
or executive mayor in accordance with the directions of the executive 
committee or executive mayor. 
 
1.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000 (MSA), 
makes provision for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that 
are necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively towards the 
social and economic upliftment of local communities. In section 6, the said 
Act sets out the duties of municipal administrations, including the 
requirement that the administration of a municipality must be responsive to 
the needs of the local community; must facilitate a culture of public service 
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and accountability amongst staff; must take measures to prevent 
corruption; must give members of the local community full and accurate 
information about the level and standard of municipal services they are 
entitled to receive; and must inform the local community how the 
municipality is managed, of the costs involved and the persons in charge.  
 
The oversight function of a municipal council is not spelt out clearly, 
although section 11(3) (j) of the MSA lists one of the functions of council 
as the monitoring of the impact and effectiveness of any services, policies, 
programmes or plans.  
Schedules 1 and 2 of the Act contain codes of conduct for councillors and 
municipal staff members. 
 
1.7 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON OVERSIGHT 
COMMITTEES 
 
The Constitution (1996) does not express the role of separation of powers 
in the sphere of local government in chapter 7 on local government. 
Section 151(2) vests both the executive and the legislative authority on the 
municipal council. This therefore makes it difficult for oversight to go 
smoothly as the bedrock of any democracy. 
 
The section 79 and 80 of the Municipal Structures Act (1998) is the only 
part that expresses separation of powers but falls short of giving the non-
executive councillors necessary powers hold the members of the 
executive accountable for their actions. 
 
Even though the Municipal Structures Act (1998) lays foundation for the 
establishment of municipal executive structures, namely the executive 
mayors and mayoral committees, the legislation remains weak in the role 
of the non-executive councillors and the structures concerned. This calls 
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for a clearly defined statutory framework that will ensure that non-
executive councillors are able to conduct their oversight and scrutiny on 
the work of the executive members of councillors. Therefore national 
government need to come up with a legislation that gives expression to 
the notion of separation of powers at the sphere of local government 
between the executive and the non-executive arm of council or make the 
necessary amendments to the Municipal Structures Act (1998). 
 
1.8 SEPARATION OF POWERS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES  
By way of a contextual background, it is worth noting that the reforms 
undertaken by the City of Johannesburg drew inspiration from the 
oversight and scrutiny models practiced by local government in the United 
Kingdom (UK) (as per the report given by the Gauteng Department of 
Local Government officials on the 2005 UK trip), hence the discussion of 
the UK model below. 
The UK Local Government Act of 2000 introduced substantial changes to 
the structure of political management in local Government in England and 
Wales. In particular, the Act requires councils to implement new 
arrangements designed to bring about a formal separation of the roles of 
executive decision-making and scrutiny of those decisions. The Act 
created an 'executive or non-executive split' between members. 
The British law explicitly provides for the establishment of Overview and 
Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) within municipal governments and vests 
these committees with significant statutory power. These powers include 
the ability to 'call-in' decisions of the executive. Where an OSC decides to 
call-in a decision of the executive, the executive is unable to proceed with 
its planned course of action without first referring its decision to full council 
for approval.  
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Furthermore, this law allows an OSC to require members of the executive 
and officers to attend their meetings to account for their actions. While 
these provisions are used rarely, their existence in law gives significant 
weight and legal force to the operations of the OSCs. 
The concept of scrutiny in the UK helps to ensure that a council delivers 
on its mandate by creating a transparent mechanism for non-executive 
councillors to shape, question, evaluate and challenge policies, decisions 
and performance. The role of Scrutiny is distinct from that of the Executive, 
but the two should not necessarily be viewed to be in opposition to each 
other. Rather, the role of the Scrutiny should be viewed as that of a 'critical 
friend' to the Executive as well as external authorities and agencies. This 
role is exercised by means of:  
 Constructive, robust and purposeful challenge to ensure executive 
reflection on policy development and decision making; 
 Holding decision-makers to account; 
 Nurturing a partnership approach and positively influencing the 
work of external agencies; 
 Focused and proactive policy development and review in 
collaboration with executive colleagues; 
 Coordinated workload planning, which is integrated into corporate 
processes; and 
 Reflecting the voice and concerns of the public and communities by 
ensuring ongoing dialogue with the public and its diverse 
communities; taking a community leadership, focusing on issues of 
concern for communities; providing transparent processes with 
public access to information, participation, and feedback where 
appropriate. 
In addition, the non-executive councillors are enabled to take lead in 
scrutiny by maintaining independence from the Executive; working in 
constructive partnership with professional officers and advisers to support 
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scrutiny by lay people; developing an independent work programme 
informed by the priorities of a Council, and the interests and concerns of 
the public; as well as the desire to support the development of services 
that benefit the public at large. 
According to the officials (2005 UK trip report), overview and scrutiny is 
also intended to make an impact on the delivery of public services, by 
promoting the well-being of communities and improving their quality of life. 
In addition, its focus is on scrutinising policies, plans and budgets; carrying 
out reviews of policy and service performance in line with strategic 
objectives; monitoring service performance against key indicators; as well 
as contributing to the continuous improvement of public services.  
It is worth noting that the law that introduced reforms in the governance of 
Local Government in the UK has been highly contested from some 
quarters and it has yielded mixed results in different parts of that country 
(UK). Nevertheless, issues and lessons from the experience of the UK 
could inform ongoing debate as well as the development of effective 
oversight by legislatures in Local Government, and specifically could 
assist both the national government and the Gauteng Provincial 
Government to reflect on the Governance Model adopted by City of 
Johannesburg. 
Below are some of the critical issues and lessons from the UK 
experiences: 
 The UK local government system is open and transparent. For 
example, local cabinet meetings are open to the public and 
opposition parties. While only cabinet members can vote when a 
decision must be taken, all documents and other information are 
generally available to non-executive members, including those of 
opposition parties.  
- 14 - 
 
 While the new system has enhanced the role of councillors in 
oversight and scrutiny activities, there appears to be a general 
dissatisfaction with the new arrangements amongst non-executive 
councillors. The majority of them are of the view that they are less 
involved and less influential in council decision making processes. 
The main issue here is that they are no longer in the position to 
make executive decisions as it was the case during the previous 
committee system. 
 Another key aspect of the OSC system is its emphasis on co-
operation across different political parties. Non-executive 
councillors are expected to work in a collegial manner, while party 
caucuses are expected to play little or no role in determining the 
decisions made in OSCs. It is nonetheless not clear if this is indeed 
the case.  
 While OSC structures play an important role in monitoring the 
executive and holding it to account for its programme, there is 
strong outward focus, where scrutiny is concerned with the delivery 
of all public services in the municipal space, rather than the 
portfolios of the executive alone. As part of this work, scrutiny 
panels conduct inspections and reviews of public services. There is 
also an emphasis on the outcomes of public policy and their effects 
on the community.  
 An important factor in the success of scrutiny processes is the 
choice of key issues on which the scrutiny panels should focus. 
Rather than attempting to review and monitor all aspects of the 
council's work, effective OSCs have selected a limited number of 
key issues and focused on them during the course of its work.  
 Since inception with the passing of the UK Local Government Act in 
2000, the UK system councils are still grappling with the 
appropriate design of scrutiny structures and no overall model has 
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been adopted. Rather, experimentation and innovation are 
emphasised, with each council free to set up its own specific 
arrangements. 
1.9 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.9.1 PROBLEM 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) in section 151 (2) 
vests both the executive and legislative functions with the municipal 
council. As a result, the only way to achieve a split is by way of 
delegations from executive functions to the legislative arm. Specifically at 
the level of the COJ, the limitations imposed by the current legislation 
were also posing some challenges. The absence of a specific legislative 
framework that specifies the roles and functions of the oversight and 
accountability model as is the case with both the national and provincial 
legislatures renders the work of these newly established committees in the 
COJ ineffective as they cannot really oversee their colleagues on the 
executive who also occupy senior positions in the same council. This is 
also due to the fact that they are not supported by any piece of legislation 
at this point in time. 
The Constitution (1996) clearly separates the powers and functions of the 
executive and non-executive members in both the national and provincial 
spheres of government. The Constitution has separate chapters for the 
Parliament and the national members of the executive and as well as 
separate sections in respect of provincial legislatures and provincial 
executive members. The constitution does not give in detail such powers 
and functions in the case of local councils and local members of the 
executive.  
This therefore means that a weak legislative landscape does not afford 
sufficient powers to the oversight and accountability portfolio committees, 
which makes it extremely difficult for these committees to hold the 
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executive accountable for its actions.  
To further complicate matters it then becomes difficult for these 
committees if not legislated to be able to have all the resources they need, 
to undertake their functions. 
Even though the establishment of this model in COJ was premised on 
improving governance and service delivery, it would appear that it is being 
derailed by the lack of the legislative prescripts that support this move. 
 
1.9.2 KNOWLEDGE GAP 
Although research on the oversight and accountability mechanisms as 
implement by both the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures in South 
Africa exists, very little has been published on oversight and accountability 
at the sphere of local government.  The researcher also anticipates that 
the research will contribute towards legislative reforms that might lead to 
the drafting of specific pieces of legislation that will categorically spell out 
the roles and responsibilities municipal councils have in holding the 
members of the executive responsible for the decisions they make 
regarding public funds. 
The researcher has also taken note that proper oversight and 
accountability at the sphere of local government remains weak. This is 
unfortunate because local government as the sphere of government that is 
closest to the people remains the one that is responsible for service 
delivery and overall realisation of the national imperatives. It means then 
therefore that, in order for local government to manage its finances 
properly and deliver on the set service delivery plans as tabled on each 
municipal integrated development plans, local government needs to have 
a properly legislated body formed of non-executive members that would 
conduct scrutiny and oversight on the work that the executive is doing, as 
it is the case with both Parliament and Provincial Legislatures.   
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An establishment of such an oversight and accountability body should not 
be as slow as it is the case at this point in time. Although the researcher 
understands that the apparent poor policy direction on this matter is linked 
to the absence of a specific legislative framework that gives some 
guidance to matters of committee make-up and powers and functions of 
such committees. The researcher anticipates that this research report will 
give some guidelines to those authorities charged with the responsibility of 
setting up these committees at the local sphere of governance.  
  
1.9.3 CONTEXT 
 
There was limited flow of information in respect of which reports were 
being considered within each of the chapter 80 Committees and the status 
of report reviews. This made it also difficult to access information with 
regards to progress and stage of such discussions.  
 
Thus, the approach of the City of Johannesburg was influenced by the 
factors outlined above. The amendments to the City’s previous institutional 
and governance model were based on the need to maintain and promote 
optimal governance structures, whilst also ensuring that institutional 
capacity is streamlined to enhance service delivery.  
 
Lessons were drawn from international trends, whereby legislatures are 
seeking to enhance their role in the governance process of government. 
The end of the previous local government term of office and the 2006 
municipal elections provided an ideal opportunity to effect any necessary 
changes to the model. 
Against this background, the then Department of Local Government 
(DLG), together with the City of Johannesburg, embarked on a study to 
document and assess how this new oversight model has been working. In 
the main, this study was aimed at achieving two main objectives, which is, 
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assess the functioning of this new oversight structure and draw lessons 
and make recommendations on whether or not the model should be 
adopted and be extended to all Gauteng municipalities.  
Effectively, the task was to investigate whether this new arrangement is an 
appropriate response to the challenges of strengthening the oversight and 
accountability function in the local sphere of government. The investigation 
was benchmarked against the objectives as outlined in the implementation 
of the pilot. Some international benchmarks and experience were also 
used as a basis to draw lessons on what works and does not.  
Taking note of the findings of the Gauteng Department of Local 
Government study conducted in 2007, the main aim of this exploratory 
study was therefore to evaluate the functionality of the Governance Model 
implemented by the City of Johannesburg. This study was conducted 
against the background of interventions put in place by both the City and 
the Department with the view to enhance the functionality and efficiency of 
the model. 
The objectives of this exploratory study were therefore to: 
 Re-confirm the rationale behind the adoption of the Governance 
Model of the City of Johannesburg; 
 Analyse the institutional arrangements that were put in place to 
operationalise the Model. This would, among others, focus on the 
challenges, the capacity requirements and resources needed, and 
what have been achieved in that regard; 
 Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Oversight and 
Accountability Model in terms of: 
 Holding the Executive accountable; 
 Improving service delivery; and 
 Promoting public participation and deepening democracy. 
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 Make recommendations that seek to bring about improvements in 
the manner in which the Model is implemented, and how it could be 
further rolled out to other municipalities in the Gauteng Province 
and countrywide. 
 
1.10 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The aim of this study is to assess the functionality of the new oversight 
and accountability models of the City of Johannesburg, and to assess the 
implementation and functionality of this new governance model, and 
whether it could be replicated across the Gauteng province and 
countrywide. This study will be exploratory, given that it intends to assess 
a matter that has not been well investigated at the sphere of local 
governance before. Neuman (2003) argues that an exploratory research is 
suitable in circumstance whereby a social phenomenon hasn’t been 
written about formulates precise questions that future research in the 
subject may investigate more and that there is no baseline data to move 
from. 
As already been argued, the current local government legislation and 
system of local government in South Africa vest both the executive and 
legislative functions with the municipal council. As a result, the only way to 
achieve a split is by way of delegations of executive functions to the 
executive arm. Specifically at the level of the City of Johannesburg, the 
limitations imposed by the current legislation were also posing some 
challenges:  
 Limited opportunity for debate in council, with council format of 
discussion confined to written questions for the Executive Mayor 
and MMCs only. 
 No provision being made for question time and through discussion 
on issues tabled at council.  
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 There was limited flow of information in respect of which reports are 
being considered within each of the chapter 80 Committees and the 
status of report reviews. 
 It was also difficult to access information with regards to progress 
and stage of these discussions.  
 
Thus, the approach of the City of Johannesburg was influenced by the 
factors outlined above. The amendments to the City’s previous institutional 
and governance model were based on the following: 
 The need to maintain and promote optimal governance structures, 
whilst also ensuring that institutional capacity is streamlined to 
enhance service delivery.  
 International trends, whereby legislatures are seeking to enhance 
their role in the governance process of government.  
 The fact that the end of the previous local government term of office 
and the 2006 municipal elections provided an ideal opportunity to 
effect any necessary changes to the model. 
 Analyse the institutional arrangements that were put in place to 
operationalise the oversight models in the City of Johannesburg. 
  This would, among others, focus on the implementation 
challenges, the capacity requirements and resources needed, and 
what have been achieved in that regard; 
 Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the oversight and 
accountability models in terms of: 
 Holding the executive accountable; 
 Improvements in service delivery; and 
 Promoting public participation and deepening democracy. 
 Discuss the policy and legislative implications of the oversight and 
accountability models, and assess the ability of local government 
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Councils to conduct oversight and scrutiny on the work that the 
Executive does. 
The researcher expects that this study will contribute towards a knowledge 
gap that exist on oversight and scrutiny at the level of local governance in 
the country, for the City of Johannesburg is the pioneer in implementing 
this model in the South Africa. Local governance scholars and 
practitioners could also utilise the findings of the study to motivate for a 
review of a number of pieces of legislation to give power to similar models 
as implemented in the City of Johannesburg. This study could open a 
debate on powers and functions of local government as a sphere of 
governance that is closest to the public in relation to its ability to effect 
good governance and ensuring service delivery.  
1.11 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
 How can local government as an institution conduct meaningful 
oversight and accountability? 
 
1.11.1 SECONDARY QUESTIONS 
 Do existing institutional arrangements enable public participation in 
oversight and scrutiny?  
 How can the shift from chapter 80 to Section 79 committees 
strengthen political accountability?  
 Has the City of Johannesburg gone far enough in establishing 
mechanisms to improve service delivery?  
 
1.11.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
The research is regarded as significant based on the fact that local 
government is the closest sphere of government to the public. It means 
then, that local government is at the coal face of service delivery. 
However, the researcher has noted that oversight and accountability still 
remains extremely weak if at all existent. The researcher notes that by 
having such an oversight and accountability structure in local government. 
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Both service delivery and financial and project management would vastly 
improve the manner in which things happen at the level of local 
government. The study therefore seeks to become a stimulus for change 
in the manner in which oversight and accountability is being conducted in 
local government and that a debate on legislative reform that enables 
oversight and accountability at this level takes place.   
 
1.12 RESEARCH OUTLINE 
This research report is divided into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction: Introduces the study and background details 
to the study. The also chapter provides an overview of the legislative 
framework within which oversight and accountability mechanisms, such as 
the COJ governance model functions. The chapter discusses the problem 
and purpose statement. The chapter also includes research questions and 
lastly discusses the significance of the study. 
  
Chapter Two: Literature review: This chapter covers the relevance of 
literature review in academic research. The chapter also covers debates 
on the notion of separation of powers and accountability, international 
experiences on separation of powers in local government, the oversight 
and accountability role of the South African Parliament, and some lessons 
learned from Provincial Legislatures.” 
 
Chapter Three:  Research Methodology: This chapter outlines the 
research design and methodological approach utilised to undertake this 
study. The selection of the City of Johannesburg as a case study is 
explained, as well as the selection of the respondents. Furthermore, the 
researcher discusses how data will be analysed and interpreted. Lastly, 
the researcher discusses the reliability and validity of the data and ethical 
considerations will be maintained. 
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Chapter Four: Data Presentation and Discussion of Findings: This 
chapter presents and discusses the findings of this exploratory study 
conducted in the City of Johannesburg based on the in-depth interviews, 
focus groups and documentary analysis. In particular, the chapter provides 
details regarding perceptions of respondents as indicated in the 
methodology section.  
 
This chapter also presents the challenges in implementing oversight and 
accountability in the local sphere of governance in the South African 
context with particular reference to the City of Johannesburg given the 
range of matters raised by the respondents. 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation: This chapter draws 
conclusion on the basis of the assertions made by the respondents and 
the municipal oversight reports that the research has read and analysed. 
Secondly and lastly the chapter advances recommendations that would 
assist policy developers and implementers should they review the current 
local government legislations.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter constitutes the literature review. The chapter covers the 
relevance of literature review in academic research. The chapter also 
covers debates on the notion of separation of powers and accountability, 
the oversight and accountability role of the South African Parliament, and 
some lessons learned from Provincial Legislatures.” 
 
2.2 REASONS FOR LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review is specific to academic research (Badenhorst 2007:43). 
Its significance in academic research is that it allows the researcher to 
discuss previous research, theoretical frameworks and locates the study at 
hand within the available body of knowledge.  Creswell (1994:21) argues 
that, literature review traces available trends on the subject matter and 
enables the researcher to fill in the existing gap in the body of knowledge 
and relates a study and locates it within the academic debates. Moreover 
literature review enables the researcher to structure his or her study whilst 
justifying its importance, showing how his or her findings relate to other 
published findings on the same subject matter and maintaining the focus 
of the study. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this current study the researcher 
proposed to conduct literature review for two major reasons, namely, to 
identify gaps within available literature on oversight and accountability in 
local governance and to establish and understand the theory which the 
researcher suggested to use as the lens to comprehend the institutional 
capacity in implementing the oversight and accountability at the sphere of 
local government. 
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2.3 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The notion of separation of powers and accountability serves as a 
conceptual and practical framework for this report. It presents a contextual 
framework for the discussion on oversight responsibilities and functions at 
the local sphere of government.  
In terms of conventional wisdom, in its crude form, separation of powers 
between the three arms of the state (the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary) prevents the abuse of power by the state. Carpenter (1994) 
argued that powers vested in the state need to be limited and contained, 
irrespective of such state being a democratically elected or politically 
legitimate. The dictum in this case is the idea that the legislature makes 
laws, the executive implements them, and the judiciary applies and 
interprets them. This implies that: 
 The legislature does not administer laws and does not function as a 
court of law; 
 The executive does not exercise legislative or judicial power; and  
 The judiciary does not have legislative or executive powers. 
 
This notion of separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and 
the judiciary enables the executive to implement government programmes 
within delegated powers, while at the same time allowing the legislative to 
strengthen its ability to make laws and execute the oversight function. 
Having said that, the challenge is that, in practice, such a clear-cut model 
barely exists. Usually, the executive arm of government determines policy, 
while the legislature is confined to scrutinising policy and making 
recommendations to the former. 
Hedger and Blick (2008) argue that the accountability relationship is a 
horizontal one, and is made possible by the clear separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislative authority, and that this forms 
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bedrock of democratic systems of government. Indeed this is true, for 
Brazier, Flinders and McHugh (2005) is of the view that the scrutiny of 
executive arm of government and holding it accountable for its actions is 
the key function of the legislature. McGee (2002) concurred, by saying that 
being held accountable for the exercise of power is a requirement for 
democracy.  
According to, Corder, Jagwanth, and Soltau, (1999); they argue that 
oversight is a commodious concept that refers to the crucial role of 
legislatures in monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive 
organs of government. The term is used to define a large number of 
activities carried out by legislatures in relation to the executive.  More 
specifically, and embracing the Constitutional provisions set-out above, 
Besdziek and Senay (1999) define oversight as follows: 
‘’Oversight in the South African provincial context is the proactive 
interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and 
administrative organs of a province that encourages compliance with 
the constitutional obligation on the executive and administration to 
account to the public’s elected representatives, and which advances 
the ideals of good governance, development and co-operative 
governance”    
According to Griffin (2005), these effectively stand guard as watchdogs 
over the executive and act as guardians of integrity on behalf of the 
citizens. Gutto, Soncga, and Mothoagae (2007) concur with this assertion 
that oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and 
structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the 
implementation of laws, the application of budget and strict observation of 
statutes and the Constitution. In addition and most importantly, it entails 
overseeing the effective management of government departments by 
individual members of the Cabinet in pursuit of improved service delivery 
- 27 - 
 
for the achievement of a better quality life for all citizens. In local 
government as the sphere of government that is closest to the people, the 
Council and the in the City of Johannesburg plays the role that gets played 
by Parliament of holding accountable the Members of the Mayoral 
Committees which are political stewards of the Departments. 
In addition, for the specific purposes of this paper, accountability 
addresses the concerns that governments, in this case local governments, 
and their agencies should fulfill and, where problems occur or complaints 
arise; there should be mechanisms available to hold the executive to 
account for their actions or omissions. Gutto, et al. (2007) sees 
accountability as a social relationship where an actor feels an obligation to 
explain and justify his or her conduct to some significant other. 
Accountability then refers to institutional practices of giving account of how 
assigned responsibilities are carried out.  
Corder, et al (1999), argue that accountability can be understood in two 
senses, that is, a technical sense as it refers to the duty of the head of 
department to account as ‘accounting officer’ to his or her Minister, the 
Auditor-General and finally the Public Accounts Committee. This refers to 
giving account of actions and spending. This definition responds to the 
Public Finance Management Act (1999) notion of administrative 
accounting of the public officials.  
The second one is a wider understanding that accountability requires 
Ministers and MECs to give an explanation and justification against criteria 
of some kind and their decisions or actions. This therefore also requires 
that the person goes back and make amends for any fault and takes steps 
to prevent its recurrence in the future. 
The exercise of that type of power in a constitutional democracy is that the 
administration or executive is overseen by, and held accountable to an 
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organ of government distinct from it. This resonates with the separation of 
powers, which provides for checks and balances in respect to the 
executive’s exercise of executive power, thus making the executive more 
accountable to the elected legislatures and the public as a whole. 
Murray and Nijzink, (2002: 88) argue that in order to concretise the 
assertion above, there are four elements that are necessary for political 
accountability, as required by the Constitution (1996), to work: 
i. Persons who have the power to make decisions and put them into 
effect; 
ii. Objectives or standards that are attained by those persons; 
iii. Na authority to whom the decision maker is answerable 
iv. Some means of calling those responsible for decisions to account. 
Furthermore, Calland (1999) argued that “the executive arm is able to 
dominate the legislature because it has the expertise, resources and 
experienced technocrats”, resulting in a relative imbalance of powers 
between the executive and the legislative arms. This makes the institution 
of a viable system of checks and balances, as well as consistent lobbying 
for the continuous capacity development for the legislative arm very 
imperative if the separation of powers between the arms of the state is to 
materialise. 
It is therefore worth noting that the rise to prominence of accountability on 
the part of the historically powerful executive is tied with the need to 
promote good governance. This term is usually used as a short-hand for 
arguing in favour of principles of good governance that should be upheld 
by governments. These principles are: 
 Transparent governance; 
 Adoption of mechanisms of accountability; and 
 Encouraging and promoting participatory democracy. 
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According to literature, there are various forms of oversight systems that 
could be adopted by a government. Among others, the following are 
prominent: 
 Oversight and scrutiny of policy and administration, and public 
accounts committees;  
 Oversight on the usage of public finances; and  
 Oversight on the implementation of policy. 
 
In terms of these forms, the legislature makes use of portfolio and 
standing committees to advance its oversight role. This therefore means 
accountability seeks to address the concern that governments, in this case 
local governments and their agencies should fulfill their responsibilities. 
Where problems occur or complaints arise, there should be mechanisms 
available to hold the executive to account for their actions or omissions. 
 
2.4 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY ROLES IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT 
 
2.4.1 Oversight and Accountability 
The conventional Westminster view on oversight inherited by most of the 
former colonies of Britain is in most instances adversarial and viewed as 
the purview of opposition politicians, rather than the legislature as an 
institution. In this instance, emphasis is placed on ensuring compliance 
with approved public spending by the executive, (Brugge, 2008). 
In the context of South Africa, oversight could be defined as a 
constitutionally mandated function of the legislature to scrutinise and 
oversee the executive and other organs of the state. It therefore follows 
that oversight is a combination of informal and formal, and structured 
scrutiny exercised by the legislature in respect of: 
 The implementation of laws; 
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 The application of the budget; 
 The observation of statute and the Constitution; 
 Overseeing the effective management of government departments 
and state-owned enterprises to ensure improved service delivery. 
According to the document entitled, South African Parliament, Oversight 
and Accountability Model: Asserting Parliament’s oversight role in 
enhancing democracy (1994). The functions of oversight include: 
 To detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct by government and public entities to 
protect the rights and liberties of citizens; 
 To hold the government to account on how it uses the tax payers’ 
money to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of 
government; and 
 To ensure that policies announced by government and authorised 
by parliament are delivered. 
 
On the basis of the above account, it could be easily concluded that in the 
context of South Africa, the concept of oversight is broad and include a 
number of aspects, namely, political, administrative, financial, legal, ethical 
as well as strategic elements. 
 
2.4.2. Definition and Functions of Accountability 
Brugge (2008) argues that, accountability could be defined as a social 
relationship where ministers and their departments, national public 
entities, and other national bodies such as commissions feel obliged to 
explain and justify their conduct to the accountability forum, in this case 
Parliament. 
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The functions of accountability include: 
 To enhance the integrity of public governance to protect the 
government against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other 
manifestations of inappropriate behaviour; 
 To effect democratic control; 
 To improve performance, which result in institutional learning and 
improved service delivery; and 
 To promote transparency, responsiveness and answerability in 
order to ensure public confidence in government, and bridge the 
gap between the governed and the government. 
A distinguishing feature between oversight and accountability is that the 
former (oversight) involves initiative undertaken by the legislature to 
scrutinising the actions of the executive, while in case of the latter 
(accountability), the onus lies with the different Ministers and the 
departmental officials, public entities and other national bodies to explain 
their actions to the legislature. It could, nonetheless, be argued that in 
practice, accountability by departments and government agencies is the 
outcome of oversight and scrutiny by the legislature. 
 
2.4.3 Accountability and Oversight instruments in the context of the 
South African Parliament 
According to the document entitled, South African Parliament, Oversight 
and Accountability Model: Asserting Parliament’s oversight role in 
enhancing democracy (1994), accountability and oversight instruments 
adopted by the South African Parliament are classified into several 
categories, namely, the role played by Committees to oversee the 
Executive and to ensure accountability on the part of the different organs 
of the State; the application of plenary processes; as well as the utilisation 
of activities and reports from institutions of the State that support 
constitutional democracy to further enhance oversight functions of 
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Parliament. 
                                                           
a) The practices of committees to effect accountability and 
oversight 
The mandates of the Parliamentary Committees are provided for in the 
rules of each of the two the Houses of Parliament (namely, the National 
Council of Provinces and the National Assembly) as well as in Joint Rules. 
These Committees are responsible for scrutinising legislation, exercising 
oversight over the activities of government, and interacting with the 
general public through hearings and requests for submissions before Bills 
are passed into Acts. 
Oversight tools employed by Parliamentary Committees include: 
 Oversight visits that include physical inspections; 
 Conversing with people; 
 Departmental briefing sessions; 
 Annual and departmental budget analyses; 
 The consideration of strategic plans and annual reports; 
 Calls for submissions and petitions from the public;  
 Public hearings; and 
 Assessing the impact of delivery and developing reports for 
adoption and making recommendations for the two Houses to 
consider. 
Parliamentary Committees are in essence conducting their business on 
behalf of the two Houses of Parliament; hence they are expected to 
prepare reports with recommendations for presentation. Different types of 
reports are presented by the Parliamentary Committees. These are the 
Legislation Report, Report on Study Tours, and Report on the Oversight 
activities of parliamentary committees, International Agreements Report, 
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Report on legislative proposals by Private members, Budget Votes 
Reports, Report on Petitions submitted to Parliament, and Report on 
Statutory Provision.  
b) Plenary processes to effect accountability and oversight.  
The following plenary processes are utilised to effect oversight:  
 
 Budget Votes 
Budget votes occur when the Minister of Finance announces the budget 
projections for the next financial year, as well as the budget votes of each 
department. The Budget only becomes law once approved by Parliament. 
Subsequent to the presentation of the Budget by the Minister of Finance, 
portfolio committees conduct hearings with the respective departments. 
During the hearings, the portfolio committees ascertain whether the 
departments have kept the promises of the previous financial year and 
spent the tax payers’ money prudently. The committees have significant 
influence in the budget votes of their respective departments. The 
departmental budgets are debated in the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces only after the portfolio committees have 
finalised their engagements with the departments. 
 
 Questions 
 
Members of Cabinet are collectively and individually accountable to 
Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
function as per Section 92 of the Constitution (Act 108 0f 1996). Members 
of Parliament use questions as a procedure of holding the Executive 
accountable. The questions could be put for oral or written reply to the 
State President, the Deputy President or the Cabinet Ministers on matters 
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relating to their portfolios. The questions centre mainly on service delivery 
and policy matters. 
 
 Statements by Members 
This process enables the Members of Parliament to make statements on 
any matter to the House. 
 Statements by Cabinet Members 
This process makes it possible for Ministers to make factual or policy 
statements in relation to government policy, and executive action. The 
statement is restricted to 20 minutes with the permission of the Speaker. 
 
 Notices of motion 
Notices of motion is a mechanism used by members of all political parties 
to bring matters of political importance before Parliament. A notice of 
motion is given to members and parties to prepare before it could be 
debate in Parliament. 
 
 Notices without motion 
These motions are moved when the presiding officer calls for any formal 
motion near the beginning of the sitting. This allows for consultation 
between parties to obtain consensus on issues that must be brought to the 
attention of the House. 
 
 Plenary debates 
During plenary debates, mechanisms such as the consideration of reports 
from parliamentary committees’ reports, scrutinising and debating the 
implementation of policy and budget votes, members’ statements and 
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questions by members of Parliament are used to conduct oversight and 
draw the attention of the executive to the concerns of the members and/or 
that of their constituencies. 
 
2.5 SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.5.1 Legislative Framework on the Oversight role of Provincial 
Legislatures  
The Constitutional mandate for the Provincial legislatures is clearly spelt 
out in terms of Chapter 3, Section 41(1)(c); Chapter 6, Section 114(2); 
Section 118, and Section 133(2) and 133(3)(b) of Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996). 
 
 Chapter 3, Section 41(1)(c) 
In terms of Section 41(1) (c), “… all spheres of government and all organs 
within each sphere must provide effective, transparent and accountable 
and coherent government”. This constitutional provision lays a foundation 
for sound governance across the three spheres of government, including 
all the other state organs within each of the spheres. 
 
 Chapter 6, Section 114(2) 
According to Section 114(2), “A provincial legislature must provide for 
mechanisms: 
(i) To ensure that all provincial executive organs of the state in the 
province are accountable to it; and  
(ii) To maintain oversight of: 
 The exercise of provincial executive authority in the province, 
including the implementation of any legislation; and 
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 Any provincial organ of state. 
This section empowers provincial legislatures to hold provincial executive 
authorities and provincial organs of state accountable and oversee their 
actions to ensure sound governance and effectiveness. 
 
 Chapter 6, Section 118 
 
Apart from ensuring transparent and affective governance, and holding the 
provincial governments accountable, provincial legislatures are 
constitutionally obliged to “facilitate public involvement in the legislative 
and other processes of the legislature and its committees” as per the 
provisions of Section 118. This constitutional provision binds legislature to 
put measures in place to promote a participatory system to further 
enhance accountability to the public in a direct manner. 
 
 Chapter 6, Section 133(2) and 133(3) (b) 
 
Section 133(2) states that “Members of the Executive Council of a 
province are individually and collectively accountable to the Legislature for 
the exercise of their powers and performance of functions”. In addition, 
“Members of the Executive Council of a province must provide the 
legislature with full and regular reports concerning matters under their 
control” in terms of Section 133(3) (b). 
 
This constitutional provision is in line with the principles of a constitutional 
democracy as it subjects the executive to oversight and held accountable 
by a distinct organ, thus making the separation of powers between the 
executive and the legislature clear. The notion of separation of powers 
provides for checks and balances in the exercise of executive power. 
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2.5.2 Oversight approaches applied by Provincial Legislatures in 
South Africa 
Oversight approaches or processes implemented by provincial legislatures 
include: 
 Public participation; 
 Reporting junctures in the budget cycle (oversight on the budgets 
and annual reports); and 
 Application of oversight report and fact finding missions (oversight 
visits). 
 
a)  Public Participation 
Approaches applied by legislatures in the promotion of public participation 
range from mass-based participation, for instance, “taking the legislature 
to the people”, to more refined participation of organised civil society 
groups such as NGOs, CBOs and experts, especially during committee 
oversight processes. 
 
b) Reporting junctures in the budget cycle 
Reporting junctures in the budget cycle include engaging with quarterly 
reports during a financial year, oversight on the budgets and annual 
reports. 
 
c) Oversight visits 
Oversight visits are fact-finding missions by portfolio committees. The 
focus of such visits is mainly on overseeing the implementation of 
departmental budget and determining whether service delivery plans are 
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being adhered to. 
 
2.5.3 Gauteng Provincial Legislature Oversight Methodology 
The oversight method implemented by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
is referred to as Programme Evaluation and Budget Analysis (PEBA) or 
Public Service Oversight Model (PSOM). This methodology was informed 
by the need for a structured, predictable and programmed approach to 
exercising oversight and holding the executive accountable, as well as the 
requirements of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (PFMA). It is 
argued that the PEBA methodology is closely aligned to performance 
budgeting, financial management, reporting and accountability regime of 
the PFMA. It could further be argued that the methodology (PEBA) gives 
effect to the Constitutional provisions discussed earlier in this section of 
the report.  
 
a) Elements of the Programme Evaluation and Budget Analysis 
(PEBA) and Public Service Oversight Model (PSOM) 
The oversight model implemented in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
has three key elements, namely: 
 The evaluation of the efficacy of public service programmes (the 
programme evaluation /analysis element of PEBA that focuses on 
the effectiveness of service delivery); 
 The appropriateness of financial resource allocation and 
management (the Budget Analysis element of PEBA that focuses 
on the efficiency of service delivery; and  
 The relationships between the four (4) variables of PSOM, namely: 
priorities, inputs, outputs, and outcomes. 
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b)  Summary of the Oversight Process of the Gauteng Legislature 
The oversight process of the Gauteng Legislature can be summarised in 
five key steps as follows: 
 The point of departure is a presentation by a researcher 
(technocratic input) on the submission of a department, including 
issues and questions to be considered by the committee. The 
researcher’s input focuses generally on the PSOM variables 
(inputs, outputs and programmes) that would inform a Committee; 
 Presentation by a department on a budget or annual report; 
 Public participation; 
 Supplementary questions to departments for immediate reply (prior 
to the end of the 5-meeting process); 
 Committee deliberations and the finalisation of an Oversight Report 
for tabling in the House. The draft oversight report is finalised by the 
support staff, researcher included, the Committee Chairperson, and 
sometimes a sub-committee. 
 
c) Successes of the PEBA Methodology 
There is numerous success factors recorded as a result of the 
implementation of this model in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. The 
most notable successes are the following: 
 Oversight process is beginning to gain “critical mass” in terms of 
placing responsibility on departments and the executive to respond 
to a wide range of performance related matters as a result of 
consolidation of the oversight process across all committees 
according to time-frames of the budget cycle (financial year); 
 The format of oversight reports is specified in advance across all 
committees to ensure uniformity during engagements with 
provincial departments and other provincial state organs; 
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 The oversight approach is highly proactive, that is, it does not rely 
on / respond to submissions from provincial departments or state 
organs. The Focused Intervention Studies (FIS), which are planned 
and structured oversight visits, are used as the primary tool of 
proactive oversight and a platform intervention in cases of service 
delivery problems or failures; 
 Oversight has graduated to focus both on matters relating to 
efficiency (budget analysis) and effectiveness (achievement of 
results), and raised for response by departments and Members of 
the Executive Council (MECs); 
 Recommendations are debated in the House; 
 Public participation is both broad-based  (which means taking 
legislature/committees of the legislature to the people) and specific 
or sectoral (through the attendance by and submissions from 
NGOs, CBOs and experts); 
 A Monitoring and Evaluation Process has been launched for both 
the quarterly and annual oversight processes, based on the PEBA 
directives; and 
 The Gauteng Legislature has a committee which exercises 
oversight over both the activities of the Provincial Legislature as 
well as the performance of the Office of the Premier. Oversight on 
the Office of the Premier, which articulates the functions of all 
provincial departments and state organs, as well as conducting 
Monitoring and Evaluation on overarching and thus ensuring that 
transversal priorities of government are met. 
 
d) Challenges and Constraints of the PEBA Methodology 
While there is a number of successes with the Model as described above, 
there are equally numerous challenges and constraints. In particular, 
oversight challenges are experienced in terms of quarterly reports, the 
budget, public participation and the disjuncture between research input 
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and Committee deliberations. These are further deliberated upon below. 
 
 External constraints that impede the oversight on quarterly 
reports 
Among other external factors that present challenge to the oversight and 
scrutiny on quarterly reports at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, the 
following two appear to be prominent: 
(i) Late submissions by provincial departments and entities. This 
tendency impact adversely on the programme of the Legislature 
given the high volume of work that needs to be dealt with and the 
limited number of meetings; and 
(ii) The lack of a consistent reporting format. 
 
 The external constraints that impede the oversight on the 
budget 
The following are some of the major constraints impacting on the oversight 
and scrutiny on the budget at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature: 
(i) A budget format that is not consistent with the performance 
budgeting requirements of the PFMA, with clear linkages between 
PSOM variables (priorities, inputs, programs, outputs and 
outcomes); 
(ii) The incorrect usage and confusion of the PSOM variables; and  
(iii) By the time the Committees engage with departments, the budget 
is already printed and fixed. This limits the ability of Committees to 
scrutinise and effect changes to the current budget in terms of the 
applicability of priorities and outcomes, performance indicators, 
targets and financial allocations. 
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 Public participation 
Public participation is still biased towards the value of attendance as 
opposed to integrating submissions into committee deliberations and 
reports. 
 
 The disjuncture between research input and Committee 
deliberations 
There seem to be a lack of a proper balance between research input and 
Committee deliberations in that there is an over-reliance on the 
technocratic input. This disjuncture should be guarded against because it 
limits debates at committee level and the articulation of pronouncements 
on political implications of service delivery challenges. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this section was to reflect on the existing literature on the 
subject of separation of powers, as well as highlight what has already 
been written about the subject. The cases studied are on the oversight 
role of the South African Parliament, and the experiences of the provincial 
legislatures in South Africa, with particular reference to the Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature.  
As demonstrated on the background section of this study, the review of 
existing literature has revealed that the reforms in the governance system 
of local government in the UK where brought about by the introduction of 
the Local Government Act of 2000. This Act gave effect to a formal 
separation of roles between councillors vested with executive decision-
making (executive councillors) and those responsible for the scrutiny of 
those decisions (non-executive councillors). Key lessons learnt from the 
case of UK and the Wales are follows: 
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 The introduction of Local Government Act has created a clear split 
between the executive and the non-executive branches of the 
municipal councils; 
 Executive accountability has been enhanced through the creation of 
a variety of transparent mechanisms. These mechanisms enabled 
non-executive councillors to influence, question, evaluate and 
challenge policies, decisions, as well as the performance of the 
executive; 
 Focused and proactive policy development and review by non-
executive councilors in collaboration with their executive colleagues 
have been made possible; 
 The concerns of the communities and the general public are taken 
into consideration by ensuring ongoing dialogue and promotion of 
public participation, making information accessible, and providing 
feedback where appropriate; 
 The system puts emphasis on co-operation among different political 
parties for the purposes of oversight, scrutiny and holding the 
executive accountable for their decisions and performance, while 
party caucuses are expected to play very little role if not none; and  
 The key success factor of the scrutiny process is dependent on the 
prioritisation of vital issues on which the scrutiny panels should 
focus instead of attempting to review and monitor all of the work of 
municipal councils. 
Despite the positive experiences of the UK oversight and scrutiny model 
for local government, there is nonetheless some level of dissatisfaction 
with the system on the part of the non-executive councillors. These 
councillors have a perception that the new governance mechanisms are 
disempowering them as they believe that they now have a limited role to 
play in influencing decision-making processes in councils as compared to 
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the old committee system. 
 
In the case of the South African Parliament, a number of valuable lessons 
have also been learned in terms of how oversight activities are carried out. 
In South Africa, it is the primary and overarching role of Parliament to 
exercise oversight and hold the executive accountable. Oversight in this 
case is a combination of informal and formal, and structured scrutiny 
exercised by Parliament in respect of a variety of issues. These include 
overseeing the implementation of laws, application of the budgets, the 
observation of statute and the Constitution, as well as overseeing the 
management of government departments, state-owned enterprises and 
other agencies of the state in order to ensure improved service delivery. 
Oversight functions, therefore, include detecting and preventing abuse, 
arbitrary behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct by government 
and public entities to protect the rights and liberties of citizens, holding the 
government to account on how it uses public funds to ensure efficiency 
and effectiveness of the operation of government, and ensuring that 
policies announced by government and authorised by Parliament are 
delivered. In short, the concept of oversight in the context of South Africa 
incorporates political, administrative, financial, legal, ethical as well as 
strategic elements. 
On the other hand, accountability functions of Parliament include 
enhancing the integrity of public governance to protect the government 
against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other manifestations of 
inappropriate behaviour, effecting democratic control, improving 
performance of state institutions, and promoting transparency, 
responsiveness and answerability in order to ensure public confidence in 
government. 
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The main distinguishing feature between oversight and accountability is 
that the former involves initiatives undertaken by the legislature to 
scrutinise actions of the executive, while in case of the latter, the onus lies 
with the different members of the executive and the departmental officials, 
public entities and other national bodies to explain their actions to the 
legislature. It could nonetheless be argued that in practice, accountability 
by departments and government agencies is the outcome of oversight and 
scrutiny by the legislature. 
Parliament has adopted a variety of accountability and oversight 
mechanisms to enable it to meet its constitutional mandate. These 
incorporate oversight activities of the parliamentary standing and portfolio 
committees, oversight activities by the plenary, and the utilization of 
activities and reports from state institutions responsible for supporting 
constitutional democracy and other statutory bodies. 
Provincial Legislatures are also constitutionally empowered to adopt 
mechanisms that would ensure that all provincial executive and other 
organs of the state that fall within its jurisdiction are accountable to it. 
These mechanisms should in addition enable the maintenance of 
oversight on the manner in which the executive authority and other 
provincial organs of the state execute their authority.  
Furthermore, Legislatures are mandated to facilitate the involvement of the 
public in legislative and other processes of these institutions and their 
committees. Three oversight approaches are implemented by provincial 
legislatures, namely; public participation, the scrutiny and analysis of 
departmental budgets and annual reports, and the application of oversight 
reports as well as fact-finding missions or oversight visits. 
At Local Government level, the literature review revealed that newly 
implemented Section 79 Portfolio and Standing Committees of the City of 
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Johannesburg are largely modelled around committees of Provincial 
Legislatures, particularly the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter outlines the research design and methodological approach 
utilised to undertake this study. In the main, the study is a qualitative, and 
case study approach in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
respondents of the City of Johannesburg’s governance model. The 
selection of the City of Johannesburg as a case study is explained, as well 
as the selection of the respondents. Furthermore, the researcher 
discusses how data was analysed and interpreted. Lastly, the researcher 
discusses the reliability and validity of the data and ethical considerations 
will be maintained. 
 
Documentary analysis, literature review and in depth interviews are 
discussed under this chapter. The researcher has indicated how data 
collection was undertaken, primary, secondary sources of data as well as 
sampling strategies for the primary data sources. Furthermore, the 
researcher will discuss how data was analysed and the reliability and 
validity of the data and how this was maintained. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The researcher has chosen the qualitative approach in conducting this 
study. This is due to the fact that qualitative approach is interactive in 
nature and the researcher is a participant in the research and is able to 
associate with the respondents. It is premised on the respondents’ views 
on the matters the study would like to understand.  
 
The qualitative method developed as a counter to the quantitative school 
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of thought. This method is also termed the constructivist approach or 
naturalist (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Some refer to the qualitative research 
method as interpretative approach (Quartz, 1992). Unlike in the 
quantitative research where a broad view is critical, qualitative research is 
inductive. Categories emerged from the respondents rather than from the 
researcher.  
Creswell (1994) advises that qualitative researchers should therefore be 
honest when interpreting social reality and rely on voices and 
interpretations of the respondents. In the qualitative approach the 
researcher is very active and engages with the respondents to generate a 
detailed understanding of the social reality under study.  
The distance between the researcher and the researched is reduced as a 
researcher can live with the respondents while studying them and this is 
called ethnography. The language reporting for qualitative research uses 
researcher-value laden vocabulary and uses words such as discover, 
understanding and meaning (Creswell, 1994). Qualitative language is 
personal and informal. 
Furthermore, Welman (2005:6) argues that the qualitative research 
method was selected because of its ability to interpret and understand 
human and organisational behaviour. Hesse-Biber (2006:5) argues that, 
this approach enables the researcher to deal with the holistic nature of 
knowledge building and knowledge production through an ongoing 
interplay between theory and methods, researcher and researched. 
The qualitative research approach was useful for it does not just assist in 
understanding how the committees operates but also to learn how that 
came about and to gain better insight behind some underlying reasons 
behind the practices. 
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Hebber-Biber and Leavy (2006:4) argue that the qualitative method is 
aimed at gaining complex knowledge directly from people with certain 
attributes or life experiences. The qualitative approach according to 
Gerring, 2007:10 is often associated with case studies as a result it is 
relevant for this research.  
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The researcher has employed a research method that combines 
secondary data sources and in depth interviews in the City of 
Johannesburg municipal council with both the executive and non-
executive councillors, administrative support official from both the 
executive and legislative arms of council.  
The study is exploratory in the sense that there is limited literature and 
research on the implementation of the new local governance model in the 
City of Johannesburg. As stated in the objectives of the study, the 
researcher’s aim was to develop a deeper understanding on the 
institutional arrangements in place to implement this policy as well as 
developing knowledge from which further inquiry on the subject may be 
built on.  
As acknowledged that the results of this study could not be common to 
other cases due to peculiar realities the City of Johannesburg finds itself 
in. It was not the intention of the researcher to depend on other cases 
elsewhere in the world but to understand the theory of policy 
implementation and also contribute to the debate on institutional 
arrangements and policy implementation on this matter of oversight and 
accountability at the sphere of local government with a particular reference 
to the City of Johannesburg new governance model.  
Yin (1994:20) agrees that case study researchers are not pre-occupied 
with generalisation to broader populations but to simplifying and 
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contributing to theoretical propositions. The researcher goal in this 
research report, as stated in the objectives, is to contribute to knowledge 
generation and provide a foundation from where further research on the 
subject can be built as well as contributing to knowledge generation in an 
attempt to address the existing knowledge gap.  
 
3.4 CASE STUDY 
Willing (2008:74) argues that, a case study is not by itself a study 
methodology but a research approach. To provide a rounded 
understanding of social phenomenon case study researchers employ 
different methods. A case study then, according to Leedy and Ormrod 
(1984:149), Creswell (1994:85) and Neuman (2006:40), is a detailed 
analysis, investigation or exploration of a social phenomenon bounded by 
time, activity and space. Yin (1994:23) defines a case study as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates social phenomenon within its real life 
context when the boundaries between that particular social phenomenon 
under study and context are blurred. These definitions emphasise the fact 
that a case study is characterised by a clear unit of analysis that bound 
space and that a case study is bound by time. Furthermore in case study 
the context is thoroughly studied so as to understand the social 
phenomenon in its totality as well as in its real life situation. In this study 
the unit of analysis is the institutional arrangements in place for 
implementing of the new governance model in the City of Johannesburg 
as approved by council in the term of local government commencing in 
2006 to 2011 as a pilot then. 
 
3.5 PRIMARY DATA 
Primary data was generated from in depth interviews with respondents 
who participated in the study. The next subchapter discusses the in depth 
interviews and the informant selection procedure that the researcher 
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followed. 
 
3.6 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
This is a qualitative method that has the ability to generate in depth, 
detailed and rich information on the subject matter. Semi-structured 
interviews provided the researcher with an opportunity to hear 
respondents speak about the institutional arrangements in place to 
implement the oversight and accountability policy as implemented by the 
City of Johannesburg. In a semi-structured interviews, questions posed by 
the researcher acted as stimulus and triggered the respondents to speak 
in detail about this particular social phenomenon (Willing 2008; 24). 
Troachim (1994) recommends semi-structured in-depth interviews for an 
exploratory study. Jolley and Mitchel (2001:67) note that qualitative 
researchers have the ability to get to the bottom of the subject by probing 
and follow up questions that the researcher may pose during interviewing. 
Muyangwa and Imenda (1996:101), Neuman (2006:151), and Mouton 
(1996:47) note that the exploratory and inductive nature of in depth 
interviews gives it weight as a research methodology.  
In depth interviews are relevant to people who can engage in matters of 
policy at a higher level and the researcher hoped that in depth and 
detailed information can be generated to understand the institutional 
arrangements in place to implement the oversight and accountability 
model as the policy had intended. Semi-structured interviews are ideal 
because the research needs to be flexible so that all aspects about the 
institutional arrangements for the implementation of the oversight and 
accountability are interrogated.  
The researcher thus has been able to move the conversation in the 
direction that answers the research questions and fulfilled the goals of the 
research as was originally intended. The researcher managed to avoid 
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leading questions during interviews.   
The respondents for the semi-structured interviews were categorised as 
follows: 
 The Municipal Manager of the City of Johannesburg  
 Speaker and Secretary of Council in the City of Johannesburg  
 Members of the Mayoral Committee (MMCs) in the City of 
Johannesburg: 
 Finance, Economic Development, Health, Housing, 
Infrastructure & Services, and Community Development 
 Chairpersons of the Oversight Committees (Section 79 
Committees) in the City of Johannesburg for: 
 Finance, Economic Development, Health, Housing, 
Infrastructure & Services, and Community Development 
 Executive Directors in the City of Johannesburg for: 
 Finance, Economic Development, Health, Housing, 
Infrastructure & Services, and Community Development 
The rationale for only focusing on the portfolios that are mentioned is that, 
other than the fact that they constitute 50% of the total number of portfolio 
committees in the municipal councils; the experience from the initial 
evaluation study has taught us that one is likely to get comparable 
responses between committees. Insistence on studying all committees is 
likely to lead to duplication. Furthermore, and particularly with regards to 
the Finance portfolio, we are likely to gain much greater insight and 
adequate indication of where sector departments are in terms of 
adherence to their plans by looking at their expenditure patterns, more so 
whether these department stick to procedures and regulations when 
procuring goods and services.  
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Lastly, the chosen portfolios were sufficient in providing a detailed picture 
on the issues that this study seeks to understand. 
Table 1 below is a summary of the interviews. The table further shows all 
the interviews that were successfully completed and those that were not 
completed, and the reasons for non-completed. 
Table 1: Respondents for the structured In-depth Interviews 
Office Designation 
Number of 
Completed 
Interviews  
Comment 
Office of the 
Executive Mayor 
 The Executive Mayor 
 The Executive Director: 
Central Strategic Unit 
 The Executive Directors: 
Transport Planning 
Two (2) 
 The Executive Mayor 
could not be 
interviewed due 
unavailability. 
 Interviews were 
successfully 
completed with both 
EDs 
Office of the 
Municipal Manager/ 
City Manager 
 The Municipal Manager (City 
Manager) Zero (0) 
 The City Manager 
could not be 
interviewed due 
unavailability 
Office of the 
Speaker 
 The Speaker of Council  
 The Secretary of Council Two (2) 
 Both the Speaker and 
the Secretary of 
Council were 
Interviewed 
Members of the 
Mayoral Committee 
(MMCs) 
 Members of Mayoral 
Committees Six (6) 
 Six (6) MMCs were 
interviewed. 
 Four MMCs could not 
be interviewed due 
unavailability 
The Whippery 
 Chief Whip of Council 
Zero (0) 
 The Chief Whip could 
not be interviewed due 
unavailability 
Chairperson of 
Committees 
 Chairperson of Committees 
One (1) 
 Interview successfully 
conducted with the 
Chair of Chairs 
Source: Own (2015) 
As can be seen from the table above, interviews could not be conducted 
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with the intended respondents in certain instances due to unavailability. 
That was particularly the case with the Executive Mayor, the City Manager 
and the Chief Whip of Council. 
3.7 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
A focus group is defined as a group of people selected for their relevance 
to a study that is moderated by a trained facilitator in a series of 
discussions designed for sharing insights, ideas, and observations on a 
topic of concern, comprised a group of 8 to 10 people, who engage in a 
discussion on a particular subject for 45 to 60 minutes. Each person is 
given an opportunity to relate their views and experiences on the subject, 
while the moderator presents topics in such a way that they trigger 
discussions. These groups could potentially generate rich information 
through data collection in a discussion form. Gathering information in a 
discussion form is particularly important as it provides the respondents an 
opportunity to relate their individual experiences while also engaging in 
some form of a group discussion. Respondents get the opportunity to 
present common or differing views, while illuminating the subject further 
(Neuman, 1998). 
The focus group discussions were held with members of the various 
Section 79 committees. The rationale was to solicit inputs on the 
experiences and impressions of ordinary committee members about the 
oversight models. Studying these committees allowed for cross-
referencing while also guaranteeing consistency in terms of successes 
and challenges facing the oversight responsibility. 
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Table 2: Respondents for the Focus Groups  
Office / Structure Designation Number of Participants Comment 
Section 79 Committees 
 Members of Section 79 
Oversight  Committees, 
Area Based Committees, 
and MPAC 
Twenty Nine  (29) Focus Group took place 
Chairpersons of Committees  
 Chairpersons of Portfolio 
Committees, Area Based 
Committees & MPAC   
Nine (9) Focus Group took place 
Minority Parties (ID, CDP, 
IFP, and UDM) 
 Whips  
Four (4) Focus Group took place 
Office of the Municipal 
Manager 
 Executive Directors and 
Directors Sixteen (16) Focus Group took place 
Office of the Speaker 
 Managers 
Three (3) Focus Group took place 
Source: Own (2015) 
As can be seen in Table 2, the focus group with Section 79 Committee 
members was particularly large far beyond the norm in terms of the 
number of participants. The one with managers in the Municipal 
Manager’s office was also large, but not too much beyond the norm.  
 
3.8 ANALYSIS OF COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT REPORTS 
Analysis of committee oversight reports has served two main purposes, in 
that it has been able to assess the quality of the reports, including the 
extent to which the produced reports address issues of concerns for 
councils, and assisted in corroborating the assertions made by 
respondents. Reading the reports with these observations in mind, the 
researcher has therefore been able to ensure that he is able to answer the 
questions of functionality and accountability, which formed the bedrock of 
this study. In essence, the thorough reading and analysis of the committee 
reports assisted the researcher in demonstrating the extent to which the 
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committees make impact.  
3.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
It should be noted that this study like any other would have some 
constraints. These constraints relate to the fact that there has not been 
much written on the matter of oversight and accountability at the level of 
local government. This is anticipated due to the fact that academic 
research builds on previous research and uses existing research to fill in 
the knowledge gap (Mouton 1996, Creswell 1994, Neuman 2006:110). 
The researcher envisages that the study will be denied an academic 
framework to use as the starting point as well as that which it could be 
measured against.  
 
This then means that the research will based on the views of those who 
will be interviewed, effectively making it a qualitative study with some 
elements of a case study reference and also relying on the secondary data 
premised on this phenomenon elsewhere. The limitation is therefore that 
this research will rely heavily on the impressions of the people interviewed. 
This will mean that the information which could be used to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations will be based on experiences 
that various respondents had in working on and accounting to the Section 
79 committees. Furthermore international literature will be consulted, due 
to the fact that the model in the City of Johannesburg is the first of its kind 
in the country, and therefore would like to see how a similar policy has 
been rolled out in those cases. This is not meant to under-value the 
usefulness of qualitative research, on the contrary, has a lot of value. 
 
It is also anticipated that the insights from international experience on this 
phenomenon of oversight and accountability at local government level will 
assist with regards to institutional arrangements in the implementation of 
oversight and accountability at the sphere of local government. Bell 
(2007:11) makes the point that the extent to which findings from the case 
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study can be generalised to other examples depends on how far the case 
study example is similar to other cases of its type. 
 
Babbie (1998:91) argues that one of the weaknesses of exploratory 
research is that they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research 
questions. This is because there is too much room for flexibility in 
exploratory research. It must be noted that the researcher acknowledges 
this weakness, however maintains that the study will generate useful 
insights and questions for other researchers to take the study forward. 
The researcher is aware that, like in all case studies, his views and values 
may influence the direction of the findings. However the researcher will 
make efforts to limit and minimise bias throughout the research processes. 
An interview guide which was designed helped the researcher during 
interviewing process in data collection and analysis. In the analysis quotes 
will be taken from the transcripts to avoid the voice of the researcher over 
clouding the evidence from the respondents.   
 
3.10 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Van der Wal (2004:49) argues for two main criteria for testing validity and 
reliability. Validity seeks to understand how well an instrument was in 
measuring the matter it is supposed to measure. Reliability on the other 
hand speaks to matters of accuracy and consistency a measuring 
instrument was in dealing with the matter being investigated. 
This means that the researcher is expected to be consistent and to ensure 
that a correct instrument is utilised for measurement. According to Mc 
Millian and Schumacher (2006:355), to deal with the issue of validity and 
reliability in a qualitative research, researchers have to record the 
interviews or focus group discussions to ensure completeness of the 
conversations and that provides adequate detail for reliability checks. The 
- 58 - 
 
researcher has had to request consent from informants for recording the 
conversations. This also assists in backing up data and sources of 
validating the information. 
3.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Creswell (2003:62) argues that social researchers should approach 
research ethically and morally. Similarly, Neuman (2006:129) agrees that 
researchers should observe the research code of conduct if their moral 
and professional obligation is to be achieved. The researcher, though 
pursuing knowledge and respondents experiences, undertakes not to 
compromise respondents’ rights in pursuit of knowledge. Even though the 
researcher works in the local governance sector, he remained impartial 
and did not compromise the subject and the findings of the study. The 
researcher explained in detail the background, objectives and purposes of 
the research to the potential respondents before data collection.  
The researcher also explained that participation in the research is 
voluntary and no informant will be forced or enticed to participate in the 
study and that the in depth interviews will be recorded for the purposes of 
transcription. In relation to the fact that participation, the participant were 
informed by the researcher, that it was on voluntary basis and that they 
had a right to stop the interview at any time if they felt uncomfortable and 
they were be assured that they will not be reprimanded for stopping the 
interview.  
The confidentiality of respondents had to be secured and the information 
they gave the researcher was only be used for the purposes of this 
research only. The researcher has made use of symbols like, A, B, C and 
so forth to ensure that the respondents’ identity remains confidential. 
Names of the participants were deleted from the transcripts and in the 
write up of the report their names were also not mentioned to maintain 
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anonymity and protect the respondents. The researcher deleted 
respondents’ names from transcripts before submitting the research 
report. Furthermore, the researcher conducted himself with integrity during 
data collection processes and throughout this research. 
Creswell (2003:66) puts forward that ethical considerations do not stop at 
the level of data collection and analysis but extends to write-up and 
dissemination of the report. The researcher has attempted to do that by 
ensuring that anonymity of the respondents who took part in this study for 
academic purposes is protected and that the results of this study will not 
be disseminated. 
 
3.11 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology that was used in 
collecting and analysing data through this exploratory study. The chapter 
discussed different research methods and the reasons for each of the 
above discussed methods were put forward. The research also would like 
to mention that the in-depth interviews with different role-players in the 
City of Johannesburg oversight model enabled the researcher to reach the 
conclusions in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the research findings based on the data collected 
through in-depth interviews, focus groups and secondary documentary 
research of this exploratory study conducted in the City of Johannesburg. 
The transcripts of the in-depth interviews and focus groups were recorded 
by the researcher in order to ensure confidentiality of the respondents. 
Furthermore, the researcher familiarised himself with the council 
documents whereby the new governance was being discussed and 
subsequently approved by council.  
Although it was a majority view that the Oversight Committees at the City 
of Johannesburg are functioning well, and to an extent, adequately 
discharging their responsibility, the study found that there were numerous 
challenges that face these Committees and the Oversight Model in 
general. The following were identified by the respondents as some of the 
key challenges facing the Committees and Model: 
In particular, the chapter provides details perceptions of respondents as 
detailed in the methodology section. The main areas explored in this 
chapter are as follows: 
 Composition and structure of the oversight committees; 
 Overall perceptions of the respondents regarding the COJ 
Oversight Model in general; 
 Views of the Respondents on the functionality of the Model two 
years after implementation; 
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 Perceptions of interviewees regarding the effectiveness of the 
Model as an oversight mechanism in the local sphere of 
government; and  
 Key challenges facing the Model according to the respondents. 
For ease of reporting and consistency, the findings of the research will, as 
much as possible, are presented along the key themes listed above.  
 
4.2 THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE OVERSIGHT 
COMMITTEES IN JOHANNESBURG 
The table below is a tabular summary of the oversight committees that are 
currently in place and in operation at the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality. Of particular significance to note from this table 
is the size of the committees in terms of the number of committee 
members or councillors serving on each committee, the level and type of 
support received by each of the committees in terms of Committee 
Coordinators and/or Researchers, as well as the alternate role played by 
some committee members. 
The table illustrates that ten Section 79 Portfolio Committees have been 
established in the City of Johannesburg to replace the traditional Section 
80 Portfolio Committees. The Portfolio Committees are a mirror image of 
the administrative departments of the City. In addition to the Portfolio 
Committees, a Standing Committee on Public Accounts (commonly 
referred to as the Municipal Public Accounts Committee - MPAC) has also 
been established. As demonstrated in the table, all these Oversight 
Committees, including the MPAC, are chaired by Councillors from the 
City’s ruling party (i.e., African National Congress - ANC). The number of 
permanent committee members ranges between 15 and 20, averaging at 
about 17 members per Committee. The latter is evident of the large size of 
the municipal council in the City of Johannesburg, which may not be the 
case anywhere in the country, let alone the province of Gauteng. 
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Furthermore, the table below demonstrates the finding that all the 
oversight committees are supported by a Committee Coordinator and a 
Researcher, although in almost all cases, a single team made of a 
Coordinator and a Researcher serves two committees.  
Table 3: List of Section 79 Oversight Committees in Operation in the 
City of Johannesburg 
Portfolio of 
Section 79 
Committee 
Committee 
Chairperson 
Elected?  
Chairperson's 
Political 
Affiliation 
Number of 
Permanent 
Members (P) 
Number of 
Alternates 
Members (A) 
Total 
Number of 
Members 
(P+A) 
Committee 
Coordinato
r & 
Researcher
? 
Environment & 
Corporate 
Services  
Yes ANC 14 3 17 Yes 
Development 
Planning & Urban 
Management 
Yes ANC 17 11 28 Yes 
Community 
Development  
Yes ANC 16 9 25 Yes 
Finance Yes ANC 15 9 24 Yes 
Economic 
Development 
Yes ANC 16 5 21 Yes 
Health Yes ANC 17 7 24 Yes 
Housing Yes ANC 17 11 28 Yes 
Infrastructure & 
Services 
Yes ANC 17 9 26 Yes 
Safety Yes ANC 20 10 30 Yes 
Transport Yes ANC 17 8 25 Yes 
Public Accounts 
Committee 
Yes ANC 17 6 23 Yes 
Source: Own (2015)  
While this study focused specifically on committees that replaced the 
traditional Section 80 Portfolio Committees, it is important to note that 
there are other Standing Committees in the City of Johannesburg that are 
not accounted for in the table above. Among such committees are the 
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Petitions and Public Participation Committee, the Rules Committee, Ethics 
and Disciplinary Committee, Audit as well as Programming Committees. 
 
4.3 RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE OVERSIGHT MODEL 
The study found that there is a widely held perception among members of 
the executive, both politically and administratively, that the new 
governance and oversight model implemented in the City is a step in the 
right direction towards the ideal of a separation of powers at the local 
sphere of government. There was also a view among this cohort that the 
model was “reaching another level of accountability”, despite a variety of 
challenges continuously experienced by all stakeholders within the 
municipality (A, Interview, 17th November, 2014).  
For this group of respondents (B, Interview, 17th November, 2014), the 
usefulness of the model lies in the fact that as members of the executive, 
they are no longer viewed as “accounting to themselves, but rather to the 
council in general through the new oversight committees chaired and 
manned by non-executive councillors”.  
Some of the respondents (B, Interview, 17th November, 2014) expressed a 
view that the traditional arrangement in terms of Section 80 portfolio 
committees was “a dangerous practice because it did not allow members 
of the executive to look at their performance from a different perspective 
and thus learn from their own mistakes and strive to improve their 
performance”.  
Among a few that held a different perspective, the main area of concern 
was the feeling that the new governance model, emphasising oversight 
and scrutiny, sometimes serves as an “impediment in the normal 
execution of duties for the Executive”. Those that viewed the oversight 
model as an impediment argued that “some members of the Executive are 
no longer free to take executive decisions just in case that would be seen 
as inappropriate by the oversight committee they dealt with”( C, Interview, 
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18th November, 2014). 
This latter view was however strongly opposed by members of the 
opposition and minority political parties in the council (D, Interview, 19th 
November 2014). For this group of respondents, “there is a great deal of 
merit in the model”. According to them, this model provides them an 
opportunity to closely monitor the performance of the municipal executive 
much better than it is the case during the general council sittings. 
Further to the views of the members of the executive and that of the 
opposition and minority parties discussed above, there was a view from 
those in the Office of the Speaker, which pointed mainly at the issue of the 
oversight committees’ legitimacy and authority.  
For the respondents (E, Interview, 20th November 2014) in the Speaker’s 
Office, whom these committees are a part of their key responsibility, the 
model is “a good attempt at enhancing sound governance in local 
government”.  
However, the lack of a clear legislative framework governing this model at 
the local sphere, vis-à-vis the provincial and national spheres, will always 
pose a threat to the relevance and the effectiveness of the model. They, in 
addition, submitted that the executive has in the past “resisted the model” 
precisely because of this legislative gap. They, however, hastened to 
recognise that “things have improved for the better now” despite there 
being no legislative changes to entrench the new governance model. 
Furthermore, for this group of respondents, “gaps still exists and the model 
could be improved even more” (E, Interview, 20th November 2014). 
4.4 FUNCTIONALITY OF THE OVERSIGHT MODEL IN 
JOHANNESBURG 
Functionality in the context of this study referred to aspects of the 
oversight model that deal with the operations of the committees rather 
than the “usefulness”, which is dealt with later in this report under the 
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“effectiveness of the model”. In this particular case, the study looked at the 
issue of committee existence, appointment or election of committee 
chairpersons, as well as the general perceptions or views of respondents 
in order to assess the functionality of the model.  
As observed in the preceding sub-sections, the issue of the existence 
committees and appointment or election of the committee chairpersons 
has been positively demonstrated, thus presupposing a positive 
assessment regarding the functionality of the model or the oversight 
committees themselves. As it concerns the respondents’ perception, there 
was more convergence on this view than divergence. This is to say that 
the study participants were generally of the view that the Section 79 
Oversight Committees are adequately functional in that they do exist, have 
chairpersons in place, and that committee meetings do take place (A, 
Interview, 17th November, 2014).  
Representing the executive and the legislative arms (Interviews A, B and 
C, 17th and 18th November, 2014) respondents from both sides argued 
that the functionality of the Section 79 Oversight Committees is, however, 
‘basic’ and not yet ‘optimal’. Basic functionality, according to the 
respondents, meant that:  
 the Oversight Committees are able to meet once per month as 
scheduled; 
 the committees have defined objectives and year plans; 
 the Committees do prepare oversight reports on the performance of 
departments they are responsible for, which are ultimately 
presented to Council with recommendations; and  
 The committees have clear terms of reference. 
There is, nonetheless, a general consensus among the respondents that 
the Oversight Committees could do more in terms of oversight and 
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scrutiny, including holding the executive accountable, which is more a 
matter of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ as indicated earlier. In order for 
Committees to achieve this goal, the level of committee functionality would 
need to reach an optimum level, which according to the respondents 
would involve the following: 
 Ensuring that the Oversight Committees are empowered and 
capable of holding the municipal departments and the Municipal 
Owned Entities (MOEs) accountable on every aspect of their 
mandate. 
 Having the ability to ask the “right” questions to the departments 
and the MOEs. 
 Oversight Committees are in a position to focus on oversight and 
scrutiny aspects that will impact on the functionality and efficiency 
of the departments and the MOEs. An example provided in this 
regards was that of the Section 79 Oversight Committee on Safety, 
which is argued to have not as yet focused its energies on by-law 
enforcement matters. 
 Finally, ensuring that the Oversight Committees are adequately 
capacitated to scrutinize reports and closely monitor expenditure 
patterns of the municipal departments and the MOEs. 
4.4.1 CAPACITY BUILDING 
Capacity building was identified as one of the key components that would 
ensure the functionality of the Oversight Model of the City of 
Johannesburg. In this context, capacity building referred to training for 
committee members and chairpersons, the allocation of support staff, the 
provision of office space and other tools required by the committees to 
executive their duties. In essence, capacity building referred to both skills 
development on the part of committee members, as well as resource 
allocation in it broad sense (Interview A, 17th November 2014). 
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In this regard, the study found that there were numerous concerns around 
training and the general empowerment of members of the Section 79 
Oversight Committees as was the case during the initial study conducted 
the Gauteng Department of Local Government in 2007. Respondents 
representing the non-executive councillors, the Office of the Speaker, 
some executive councillors (MMCs), and the officials argued that not much 
has been done in terms of equipping members of the Oversight 
Committees with the necessary skills to perform oversight and scrutiny. 
There was a general consensus across different categories of 
respondents that sector specific training is required by all the Section 79 
Committee members and that needs to be done as a matter of urgency (E, 
Interview, 20th November 2014). 
In addition, members of the opposition and minority political parties have 
raised concerns with regard to what is seen as ‘unfair and biased’ 
selection of Councillors nominated to undertake study tours D, Interview, 
19th November 2014). Among these respondents, there was a view that 
“empowerment of the Oversight Committee members through study tours 
is not equitable as it appears to be reserved for some members of the 
committees rather than all”. They argued that only members of certain 
political parties are sent on study tours which should rather be made 
available to all the section 79 Oversight Committee members regardless of 
which political party they belong to, or the party’s level representation in 
the municipality. 
In as far as the provision of administrative and physical support, in terms 
of office space to the Section 79 Oversight Committees is concerned; it 
was observed that there have been significant improvements as compared 
to what was discovered during the initial study conducted by the Gauteng 
Department of Local Government in 2007. The current study found that 
coordinators and researchers have been appointed for all the committees. 
Respondents unanimously agreed that “strides have also been made in 
accommodating the support staff, although much could still be done to 
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further improve the resource provision.” Some of the respondents reported 
a view that a separate building would be more appropriate for the 
legislative arm of Council as it is done at the provincial and national 
spheres. They argued that this would assist in drawing the line between 
the two arms of council (E, Interview, 20th November 2014).  
A development that was highly commended and hailed by almost all the 
respondents was that all the non-executive councillors have in recent 
times been allocated laptop computers, that are further equipped with 
access to e-mail and internet connection. This was viewed by the 
respondents as “a positive development that would, in time, assist the 
non-executive Councillors to perform their oversight and scrutiny 
responsibility effectively and efficiently as they would be having the 
working aids they require”.  
4.4.2 THE FUNDING OF THE OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES 
Similar to the issue of skills development and allocation of a dedicated 
working space for the Oversight Committees, the issue of funds and 
funding model was viewed as an important factor influencing the 
functionality of the Oversight Model, thus investigated.  
A respondent, whose responsibility involves, serving and supporting the 
Oversight Committees, reported that “initially the executive did not allocate 
resources to fund the model even if the separation powers model was 
adopted as a Council resolution”. The respondent further went on to 
remonstrate that “it took some time, about twelve months, for the executive 
to allocate financial resources to the legislative arm.  
There was, nonetheless, consensus among different respondents that the 
situation has in recent times improved in terms of funding and the 
allocation of financial resources to the Committees. The biggest area of 
concern was the fact that the legislature is expected to appear before the 
Budget Panel chaired by the MMC for Finance to justify what should be 
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allocated them financially. The respondents, especially those representing 
the legislative arm, retorted that “the current arrangement directly 
contradicts the notion of separation of powers because the executive still 
has an upper hand in the allocation of resources to the legislature”. In their 
view, “a funding model appropriate to the current governance model that 
emphasises the separation of powers between the two arms needs to be 
put in place”. In essence, a funding model similar to the one applied in 
respect of the Provincial Legislatures and the National Parliament was 
identified and singled out as the model to replicate.  
In conclusion, the respondents lamented the perceived silence and 
apparent lack of clarity and policy direction from the national government 
on the funding model of Oversight and Scrutiny at the local government 
sphere of government. In this regard, the respondents indicated that “a 
national policy on the funding of the oversight model at the local sphere of 
government would make it easier for the oversight committees to gain 
recognition and perform their oversight duties more efficiently” (Interviews, 
A, B, C, D and E, 17th to the 20th November 2014).  
4.5 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MODEL: IS 
THE MODEL PRODUCING RESULTS? 
An assessment on the functionality of the Oversight Committees was by 
itself not adequate to determine whether the City of Johannesburg’s 
Oversight Model was achieving its objectives or not in terms of holding the 
executive accountable. The assessment on functionality had to be 
supplemented with an exploration on the effectiveness of these 
Committees.  
In context of this study, the investigation on the effectiveness involved 
ascertaining whether the Oversight Committees were indeed fulfilling their 
core mandate of ensuring that the members of the executive are held 
accountable, including whether the Committees efficiently perform the 
scrutiny and oversight role through the promotion of meaningful debates in 
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Council as well as encouraging sound governance in the Municipality. In 
short, the question to be answered was whether the City of 
Johannesburg’s Oversight Model was achieving the results All Interviews 
A, B, C, D and E on the week of 17th November 2014) . 
 
4.5.1 ABILITY TO HOLD THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE 
When asked whether, in their view, the Section 79 Oversight Committees 
at the City of Johannesburg were successfully achieving the objective of 
holding members of the executive accountable, the respondents were 
generally positive in their responses. This view was, however, hastily 
qualified with a submission that “it could still improve”. In elaboration, the 
respondents reported that “the Model has evolved overtime, and different 
stakeholders in the Municipality have undergone a steep learning curve in 
accommodating the Model into the institutional makeup of Municipality”. In 
other words, the respondents were of the opinion that the Model was 
moving towards bringing about the desired results, even though the Model 
has been met with numerous challenges associated with acceptance and 
legitimacy (All Interviews A, B, C, D and E on the week of 17th November 
2014) . 
 
4.5.2 ABILITY TO UNDERTAKE SCRUTINY AND OVERSIGHT ROLES  
Through the interviews and focus group discussions held with different 
respondents from the Municipality, it was established that the Section 79 
Portfolio Committees do indeed undertake their oversight and scrutiny 
roles as envisaged. However, the respondents emphasized that, for a 
variety of reasons, some Committees are more effective than others. One 
of such reason stated by the respondents was the caliber and personality 
of the Committee Chairpersons, along with the quality of the support staff, 
notably Committee Researchers. With this assertion, the respondents 
clarified that in cases where the Committee Chairperson is well informed 
about his/her roles and responsibilities, and he/she is confident about 
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his/her work, including having the necessary skills, such Committee(s) 
tended to be more efficient in terms of performing their scrutiny role.  
There was, nonetheless, a general consensus among the respondents 
that “the Model has evolved overtime and the majority of the Committee 
members now have a better understanding of their roles as compared to 
the initial stages of the implementation of the model”.  
 
4.5.3 MEASURING OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERSIGHT 
COMMITTEES 
In addition to asking respondents’ perceptions on the ability Committees to 
hold the members of the executive accountable, including their aptitude to 
perform oversight, the research questions were extended to investigate 
other aspects of the effectiveness of the Committees by interrogating four 
(4) additional elements of effectiveness. These elements were: 
 Resources and support at the disposal of the Oversight 
Committees; 
 Kind of oversight mechanisms/activities undertaken by the 
Committees to ensure accountability; 
 Consistency and frequency of meetings held by the Oversight 
Committees , including attendance by members; and 
 Number and quality of oversight reports generated by the Oversight 
Committees. 
In essence, these four elements constituted supplementary tools for 
measuring the effectiveness of the Oversight Committees over and above 
the perceptions of the individuals and groups interviewed during the study. 
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a) Resources and support at the disposal of the Oversight 
Committees 
The issue of resources and support focused primarily at the nature and 
extent of financial and physical support the Committees enjoyed in order 
for them to be able to perform their oversight responsibility. The need to 
focus on this aspect was largely informed by the findings of the initial 
study, in which it was found that lack of financial support, physical space 
and support personnel hindered the Committees from performing the 
oversight and scrutiny role as effectively as was expected of them.  
The findings of the current study demonstrate that there has been a 
significant improvement in this regard. The study found that there was a 
general agreement among respondents that the situation has improved 
immensely between now and the early days of the implementation of the 
model. Significant strides have been made in terms of increasing 
personnel in the Office of the Speaker, notably, the appointment of full-
time Coordinators and Researchers for the Section 79 Committees. 
Although the level of support may not be ideal, as demonstrated in Table 1 
earlier in this report, the Committees are now able to draw on the support 
of a Researcher and Committee Coordinator/Administrator whenever 
necessary. 
b) Analysis of the oversight mechanisms and activities employed 
by Committees 
The study found that the Oversight Committees at the City of 
Johannesburg employ different mechanisms and embark on a variety of 
activities in order to fulfill their oversight and scrutiny role. Among others, it 
was found that the Section 79 Oversight Committees regularly embark on 
oversight visits, make requests for departmental reports for scrutiny 
purposes, as well as inviting Members of the Mayoral Committee and 
executive officials to clarify issues of concern before the Committees. 
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According to the respondents, oversight visits are sometimes announced 
in advance, but at times no prior announcements are made. The latter are 
commonly referred to as “unannounced oversight visits” because they take 
place without prior notification to the members of the executive 
responsible for executing the function in question. According to the 
members of the Oversight Committees, these are the most popular and 
preferred as they enable the Committees to find out the status of 
programmes and projects on the ground without the influence of 
executors. It was further established that these visits have in the past 
assisted Committees to verify claims made in reports from the 
administration, which in certain instances where proved to be inaccurate. 
In corroboration of this assertion, a respondent from the executive pointed 
out that “officials are now thinking twice before making certain claims 
regarding service delivery and outputs in their reports because they are 
aware that such claims would be verified by means of unannounced 
oversight visits”.  
In terms of the departmental reports and invites to the Members of the 
Mayoral Committee, the respondents (All Interviews held on the week of 
17th to the 20th November 2014) clarified that this mechanism largely 
involves request for submission of project status reports on one hand, and 
requests for MMCs to submit departmental reports and making 
presentations to the Oversight Committees. In terms of the latter, the 
Committees engage the member of the executive involved for clarity and 
accountability reasons. 
c) The number of meetings held by the Oversight Committees 
In order to fulfill their oversight and scrutiny role, the study found that, 
apart from attending and participating in ordinary meetings of Council on a 
monthly basis, members of the Section 79 Oversight Committees also 
meet once a month in order to attend to the business of their portfolios. As 
one of the respondents submitted, “These monthly meetings are usually 
combined with oversight visits”.  
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Further on the issue of Oversight Committee meetings, the study 
established that Committee members do not always have adequate time 
to scrutinize departmental reports because of their part-time councillor 
status. This, according to one respondent “negatively impacts on the 
effectiveness of the Committees as the members only have a limited 
amount of time to perform the scrutiny work due to them being part-time 
councillors”. This concern was also echoed by a respondent from the 
Office of the Speaker, who argued that “because the Oversight 
Committees are constituted by part-time Councillors, some of which have 
primary jobs outside of Council, they have limited, or inadequate, time to 
perform the Committee work”. 
d) The number and quality of reports generated by the 
Committees 
The fourth and final measure of effectiveness designed by the research 
team was the number and quality of reports generated by the oversight 
committees. With this measure, the research study aimed to establish 
whether the oversight reports collated and produced by the Committees 
provide an adequate account of their Portfolio Committees performance.  
When asked for their views, respondents representing different 
stakeholder groups reported differing views. On one hand, those from the 
legislative arm, vis-à-vis those from the executive arm, felt that the reports 
were generally of a good standard as they “reflected on pertinent issues 
such as over- and under-expenditure, poor performance by departments, 
and other similar issues”. However, others, especially members of the 
opposition political parties in council, were unhappy with the quality of the 
reports from the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC), reporting 
that these “were of a lesser quality, particularly in terms of content and 
lack reference to appropriate financial jargon”. 
The reading and analysis of a sample of oversight reports conducted by 
the researcher demonstrated that the reports produced by the Oversight 
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Committees at the City of Johannesburg were comparable to those of the 
Portfolio Committees at the provincial level in terms of structure and the 
manner of raising and reporting on findings to the respective Legislatures.  
This was a positive finding as the Oversight Committees at the City of 
Johannesburg and other municipalities are, for all intents and purposes, 
modeled on the Portfolio Committees at national and provincial spheres of 
government. To the extent that the sampled oversight reports produced by 
the Oversight Committees in the City of Johannesburg were comparable 
to those of the Portfolio Committees at the Provincial Legislature, the 
research team was of the view that the quality of the oversight reports was 
commendable. 
In addressing matters that respondents from both in-depth interviews and 
focus groups held, the following issues were identified by the respondents 
as some of the key challenges facing the Committees and Model: 
4.6 LACK OF A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The respondents, across stakeholder groups, reported that 
implementation of the Oversight Model is a serious challenge in the 
absence of a legislative framework that clearly spells out the roles of 
different stakeholders, how the interface between the legislature and the 
executive will unfold, and a funding mechanism for the Model. When 
asked to elaborate, the respondents reported that “at times it becomes 
difficult for the Oversight Committees to enforce rules regarding the 
submission of departmental reports or appearance of the members of the 
executive before the Committee as there is no legal framework guiding 
this interface” 
 
In a nutshell the Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998 provides for the 
establishment of various categories of municipalities in accordance with 
and for the regulation of the internal systems, structures and office bearers 
of municipalities. The Act (1998) also in Section 33, argues that a 
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municipality may establish a committee if the establishment of the 
committee is necessary, taking into account the extent of the functions and 
powers of the municipality; the need for the delegation of those functions 
and powers in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their 
performance; and the financial and administrative resources of the 
municipality available to support the proposed committee. 
 
Sections 79 and 80 of the Act (1998), create non-executive and executive 
committees: Section 79 committees are non-executive committees that 
may be established for the effective and efficient performance of any of a 
municipal council‘s functions, or the exercise of any of its powers, provided 
that the municipal council determines the functions of a committee and 
delegates duties and powers to it. The council must appoint the 
chairperson, and may authorise a committee to co-opt advisory members 
who are not members of the council within the limits determined by the 
council. The council may also determine a committee‘s procedure.  
 
As have indicated earlier these sections do not necessarily afford the 
members of these non-executive committees to call in decisions made by 
the executive nor they have the right to summon the members of the 
executive.  
 
The section 43 of the Constitution (1996) establishes Parliament and 
provincial legislatures as the legislative authorities within the national and 
provincial spheres of government, and the municipal councils as the 
legislative authority within the municipal council. Sections 55 and 114, 
gives legislatures the responsibility of ensuring that all executive organs of 
the state are accountable to the Constitution. This means therefore that 
legislatures are compelled to maintain oversight over the executive arm. 
 
This is not the case with local government as it as a sphere does not have 
such clearly defined powers and the oversight and accountability 
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committees therefore cannot really hold the executive accountable for the 
things that they do that may not be in line with public policy 
implementation plans. 
 
4.7 LACK OF SUPPORT FROM NATIONAL PROVINCIAL SPHERES 
It was felt that National and Provincial Departments do not appreciate the 
dynamics of local government. For instance National Standing Committee 
on Local Government has never met with the City during the current term 
of office and there is no such forum to facilitate such interaction 
(Interviews held on the week of the 17th to 21st November 2014). 
The required legislation at national and provincial levels does not come 
through fast enough. Such legislation would for instance have allowed the 
Office of the Speaker to determine its own budget unlike in the current 
situation where budget is determined by the Executive and yet Council is 
supposed to oversee the Speaker (Interviews held 17th to the 21st 
November 2014). 
 
4.8 PART-TIME STATUS OF COUNCILLORS SERVING ON SECTION 
79 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES 
The part-time status of members of the Oversight Committees was a major 
concern for the respondents, especially those serving on the Committees 
and those responsible for supporting the Committees.  It was raised as 
especially concerning that the Committee Chairpersons were part-time 
Councillors as well. When elaborating, the respondents emphasised the 
view that “in terms of workload load and the provision of leadership, the 
Chairpersons of Committees are on par with their executive counterparts 
(MMC) who are full-time Councillors while former remain part-time 
Councillors”.  
In agreement with this view, it was further highlighted by the respondents 
“this part-time status does not allow members of the Section 79 Oversight 
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Committees to do diligent work that is expected due to the limited time that 
they have available to them. This state of affairs further perpetuates the 
information gap that exists between the executive and the members of the 
Oversight Committees, and renders the Committees less effective than it 
otherwise would have been if the members were full-time councillors like 
members of the Portfolio Committees at the provincial and national 
legislatures”. 
 
4.9 INADEQUATE FINANCIAL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES 
Although there is a general consensus among the respondents that the 
situation in terms of the provision of resources to the Office of the Speaker 
for supporting the Oversight Model has improved, the situation is not yet 
ideal. As reported by the respondents, “the lack of a defined funding model 
still limits the extent to which the Committees can access and utilise 
resources for the purpose of oversight and scrutiny”. It was lamented that 
“the Legislature and the Oversight Committees, in particular, is still at the 
mercy of the Executive for funding its operations, and this compromises 
the independence of the Oversight Committees”. 
 
4.10 LIMITED NUMBER OF OVERSIGHT MEETINGS 
There was a general feeling that monthly oversight meetings needed to be 
revisited as this does not tally with the amount of work that has to be done. 
It was the respondents’ view that “meetings may need to happen more 
often than just once a month” (Interviews held on the week 17th to the 21st 
November 2014).  
The respondents were, however, mindful of the challenge that part-time 
Councillors that are either self-employed or employed elsewhere on a 
permanent basis might require additional time-off from their non-council 
responsibilities, which may be to the detriment of their businesses or full-
time employment engagements.  
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The importance of more regular Oversight Committee meetings and 
oversight visits to programmes and projects was however identified as 
critically important as the current number of meetings is insufficient to 
allow the Committees to perform their oversight and scrutiny function fully. 
The other point one of the Councillors make is that if these visits were 
stipulated into law even at the local sphere of governance like it is the 
case with national and provincial things could be done in time and their 
interventions would count (A, Interview 17th November 2014). 
4.11 ROLE CLARIFICATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE 
AND THE LEGISLATURE 
Although the respondents reported a view that the understanding of the 
Model has improved significantly since its inception, there are still some 
signs of tension and a lack of a common understanding of the Model 
between the Executive and the Legislature.  
Furthermore, a lack of role clarification continues to present a challenge 
for the Oversight Model at the City of Johannesburg. The lack of role 
clarity was especially reported to be between the Office of the Speaker 
and the Chief Whip of the ruling party.  
This matter is still attributed to a lack of a specific legislative framework 
that supports oversight and accountability and separation of powers at 
local governance level.  
LATE SUBMISSION OF REPORTS AND IRREGULAR PROVISION OF 
INFORMATION BY THE EXECUTIVE 
The Section 79 Oversight Committees as established by the Local 
Government Municipal Structures Act (1998) require relevant information 
from the Executive in time for them to perform a meaningful scrutiny. 
Contrary to this expectation, the study found that Oversight Committees 
still receive reports late. As reported by the respondents, “reports are 
sometimes received two, or even three, quarters late. This late submission 
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of reports makes the role of the Oversight Committees insignificant and 
irrelevant”. 
In the words of one of the Councillors (B, Interview, 18th November 2014) 
serving on one of the Oversight Committees, “this late submission gives 
the impression that the work we do is nothing more than rubber-stamp 
executive decisions”. 
4.12 LIMITED COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN OVERSIGHT 
Scoffe and Jaffe argued that people need to be central in any planning 
and transition process, for this gives them sense of ownership and control 
and cannot lead to any potential resistance in future. This is also agreed to 
by Harvey (2006), that it is an ideal approach to allow people to take part 
in the planning of the change process and this can be further advanced by 
continuous communication.  
The study found that there is very limited community or civil society 
participation in the oversight and scrutiny activities. According to the 
respondents (Interviews held on the week 17th to 21st November 2014), 
community participation is usually limited to ad hoc interaction with 
community members during oversight visits. Other than this, no structured 
community participation in the work of the Section 79 Oversight 
Committees is in place according to the respondents. 
4.13 UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE 
SECTION 79 PORTFOLIO COMMITTEES TOWARDS OFFICIALS  
Respondents (Interviews C and E held the 18th and 20th November 2014 
respectively) representing the Executive, particularly Mayoral Committee 
Members and Senior Managers, indicated that they are from time to time 
subjected to “verbal abuse and unprofessional conduct by some members 
of the Section 79 Committees”. According to these respondents, this 
behaviour has a potential to deter Senior Managers and other members of 
the Executive from cooperating with the Section 79 Oversight Committees 
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and “can put a strain on the relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislature to the detriment of effective oversight and scrutiny”. 
4.14 CONCLUSION 
This chapter of the report focused on the findings of the empirical study 
conducted in the City of Johannesburg. The chapter reflected particularly 
on the perceptions of a variety of stakeholders on the functionality and 
effectiveness of the Model as an oversight mechanism at the local sphere 
of government.  
The chapter also reflected on the challenges and successes of the model 
as perceived by those directly involved in the new model aimed at 
realising the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature.  
One of the most significant findings was that the new governance model 
implemented in the City is a step in the right direction towards the ideal of 
a separation of powers at the local sphere of government. The research 
findings further revealed that the model is fully functional although there is 
still room for improvement. For the respondents (Interviews held the week 
of the 17th to the 21st November 2014), it was critical that the oversight 
committees are adequately capacitated through skills training and funding.  
The absence of a piece of legislation providing for the oversight model at 
the local sphere of government, the part-time status of committee 
members, especially the committee chairpersons and inadequate resource 
allocation were identified as some of the major challenges impacting on 
the effectiveness of the model. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides conclusions and recommendations of the study. The 
main research was the lack of a legislative framework which gives 
expression to oversight and accountability at the sphere of local 
government. The purpose of the study was to conduct an exploratory 
study on the City of Johannesburg’s new governance model in an attempt 
to raise shortcomings on the current legislative framework regarding local 
governance and make suggestions on what could be done to improve this 
aspect of oversight and accountability at the sphere of local governance. 
The chapter therefore provides the conclusions of the study in an attempt 
to raise the matter of a legislative review on local government to cater for 
the oversight and accountability function such as the model implemented 
by the City of Johannesburg.  
5.2 REFINING AND IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE MODEL WITHIN 
THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG 
Based on the research methodology outlined in chapter three above, the 
following recommendations have been made aimed at making further 
improvements, refinements and institutionalising the model. 
5.3 RELATIONSHIP INTERFACE BETWEEN SECRETARY OF 
COUNCIL AND CITY MANAGER 
Given the fact that the next term of local government will begin without 
there being any changes to the legislative framework governing local 
government and noting that the relationship interface between the 
Secretary of Council and the City Manager has been characterised 
challenges in terms of reporting requirements of the Municipal Financial 
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Management Act (2003), it is recommended that a specific delegations 
and reporting agreement is signed between the office of the Speaker and 
the Office of the Executive Mayor to govern this interface. 
5.4 LOBBY FOR THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION 
The legislative environment within which the oversight model of the City of 
Johannesburg operates is an area of debate. There is a view, generally in 
the minority, that the current legislation supports the Governance Model as 
it has been implemented throughout the pilot period. However, even those 
who hold this view do admit that legislative amendments may be the best 
way of rolling out the model nationally and institutionalising it in the City. 
During the interviews, a lot of the success of the pilot was attributed to the 
political maturity of key players such as the Executive Mayor and the 
Speaker of Council. 
Oversight committees are established in terms of Section 79 of the 
Municipal Structures Act, which simply provides for the “establishment of 
council committees...” without necessarily detailing the oversight 
responsibility and authority.  This ill-defined legislative provision is contrary 
to what exists internationally (e.g., in UK) and at the national and 
provincial spheres in South Africa. 
It is therefore recommended that as medium to long term strategy, the City 
lobby Provincial and National Departments to amend legislative framework 
governing local government. 
 
5.5 STRENGTHEN THE OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER  
The office of the Speaker needs to be elevated so that it closer in status 
with the Office of the Executive Mayor.  In truly separation of powers 
model, the Office of the Speaker ought to be a separate branch 
government headed by the Speaker of Council with the Secretary of 
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Council as the administrative head. To give effect to this, there needs to 
be formal recognition of the Office of the Speaker as being on part with the 
Office of the Executive Mayor. This might serve to reduce the tendency by 
some to diminish the role of the Speaker and by extension the role of 
Council which is a body headed the Speaker. 
5.6 MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR MMC TO APPEAR ONCE A 
QUARTER BEFORE THE RELEVANT SECTION 79 COMMITTEE  
MMC appear before Section 79 Committees only by invitation of Section 
79 Committees. It was reported by some chairpersons and opposition 
councillors that it is a challenge to get some MMC to appear before their 
committees. Opposition particularly Councillors felt that in some instances 
appeared reluctant to summon/invite MMC. It was therefore strongly 
suggested by Chairpersons, Councillors and some in the Executive, that 
MMC appear before their Section 79 Committee at once a quarter. This 
would further entrench Governance Model by requiring MMC to avail them 
at once a quarter. 
5.7 INSTITUTIONAL INTERFACE BETWEEN COUNCIL AND SECTION 
79 COMMITTEES 
In the current setup, there is no institutional mechanism that allows ward 
committee recommendations and findings to be carried through onto to the 
agenda of Council. It is therefore recommended that institutional 
mechanisms be put in place to formally address this gap.     
5.8 STRENGTHENING THE WHIPPERY  
During the interviews with the Whippery, it was reported by opposition 
whips that the Whippery is dysfunctional and does not meet regularly. 
Those that attended the focus group interview alleged that the Whippery 
had only met a hand full of times instead of at least once a month. This 
may in part explain why the opposition, while rating the Governance Model 
itself, felt that the progress towards the stated goals was fair (2 out of 5). 
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In addition, previous study findings indicated there were perceptions that 
party loyalty had compromised impartiality in oversight and scrutiny. 
5.9 BUILD THE CAPACITY OF COUNCILLORS 
It is critical that the capacity of Section 79 Committee members and 
chairpersons be improved through the means of a generic and sector or 
portfolio specific training. Some of the committees, such as Development 
Planning and Urban Management, are very technical in nature and would 
therefore require some sector specific training. Many of the Councillors 
also identified training in budgeting and finance as a critical skill since 
much of oversight work dealt with budget issues thereby making it a 
minimum requirement that each Councillor be conversant with financial 
statements. 
5.10 BUILD THE CAPACITY OF SUPPORT STAFF 
As part of the establishment phase of the pilot, provision was made to 
provide Councillors with support staff that would in turn provide technical 
as well administrative support. It was found that they weren’t enough 
support staff to the required services. For example, the DA reported that 
there were 59 Councillors who had three support staff members which 
they felt was inadequate. In addition to the numbers, it was also reported 
across the board that there is insufficient content knowledge. 
5.11 STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF CHAIRPERSON 
One of key reasons cited for the ineffectiveness of Oversight Committees 
was the part time nature of Councillors as well as Chairpersons which 
made it difficult to conduct diligent oversight. A second reason why 
Chairpersons were said to be ineffective as leaders of oversight 
committees was the political seniority of MMC relative to Chairpersons 
which made it difficult for Chairpersons to encourage/force MMC account 
more effectively. In addition, the fact that Chairpersons were paid 
considerably less than MMC also meant some people appointed were not 
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of the desired level. 
It is therefore recommended that the position of Chairperson be made full 
time so as to provide the required time for effective oversight. Second, the 
elevation of the status of Chairpersons with commensurate remuneration 
can reduce the perceived political distance between MMC and 
Chairpersons.  
5.12 DEVELOP COMMUNICATION STRATEGY TO PROFILE THE 
GOVERNANCE MODEL TO THE COMMUNITY  
 
While community awareness of the Governance Model was not part the 
evaluation, it emerged during interview sessions there is a feeling within 
the City that community still does understand the Model in terms of the 
principle of separation of powers and more critically their role in the model. 
The persistence of violent service delivery protests was said to be as a 
result of communities not knowing how to air their grievances through 
public participation platforms created by the City. It was found by the 
evaluation team that there was no communication strategy aimed at 
popularising and creating community awareness of the model. 
It is therefore recommended that a communication strategy be developed 
to address this gap. The development of such a strategy is in line the 
objective strengthening Council as legislature. Council along with the 
community is able to hold the Executive accountable through public 
participation. By proving the general public with a forum to air grievances it 
is plausible to surmise communities engage in less violent protests.  
 
5.13 CONCLUSION 
The governance model of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality has come a long way since its adoption in April 2006. 
Although characterised by a variety of challenges since inception, and 
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these still continue, there are perceptions from both the executive and the 
non-executive councillors within the City that the model is necessary and 
will soon realise the objective of enhancing accountability, which will in 
turn improve service delivery and promote public participation. 
The study has established that the Section 79 oversight committees have 
been established for all portfolios of council, and these are fully 
operational. The functionality of the committees, however, may not be 
regarded as optimal owing to a number of challenges such as lack of 
adequate skills, a dedicated legislative framework, and the part-time status 
of councillors serving on these committees. These challenges require 
urgent attention if a true separation of powers is to be realised in local 
government. 
The study has, however, also been able to point to some valuable lessons 
coming out of the City of Johannesburg’s Oversight Model. These include 
the fact that Section 79 portfolio committees have been able to gain 
recognition when it comes to accounting for service delivery and budget 
spending. In practical terms, this means that members of the executive 
now acknowledge that they have to account to a particular committee of 
council, and consequently to the broader council unlike was the case 
under the Chapter 80 Portfolio Committee dispensation.  
In line with the above, the general conclusion of this study is that the COJ 
Oversight Model is a desirable model that promises to bring about 
accountability through oversight and scrutiny if well implemented and fully 
rolled-out. What is required is for the model to be fully supported and 
adequately equipped. A clearly defined legislative framework detailing the 
authority of the committees would go a long way in achieving this goal. 
Without such a legislative framework, the model will continue to strive for 
legitimacy without ensuring the desired impact. What better reference do 
we need other than our very own national and provincial SCOPAs? 
The researcher would like to register following as the lessons that need to 
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be taken to by a municipality before attempting to rollout the Governance 
Model: 
The first thing is that, should a municipality decided to do the roll out same 
model as the COJ, institutional arrangements should be in place to 
support the move. The COJ’s lack of proper institutional arrangements 
created a lot of unnecessary tension. 
Municipalities need to define roles and responsibilities regarding the 
separation of powers model from the onset to reduce unnecessary political 
tensions. 
There needs a lot of political maturity and respect among office bearers if 
the model is to be a success. The relative success of the Johannesburg 
pilot was partly attributed to the respectful relationship between the 
Executive Mayor and the Speaker of Council. A deliberate strategy for 
team building must be developed and implemented. 
It is important that Councillors understand their roles as non-executive 
Councillors. Councillors need to be prevailed upon that it is their duty to 
hold the executive to account regardless of party affiliations.  
Capacitation of Councillors should be done at the outset. Members must 
be capacitated on the work they need to do on the committees. Ongoing 
generic and sector specific training is especially critical. 
Chairpersons of Committees should, where possible, have some prior 
training or experience in the relevant field of expertise. This has come up 
as an issue that some do not have the necessary capacity to execute their 
duties properly. 
Mutual respect between role players is critical to the success of the model 
especially in the absence of a legislative framework. It is important to 
realise that every Councillors.  
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SALGA, Provincial and National Departments must be on board from the 
onset to provide support. This may assist in advocating for both legislative 
reform and synergy in similar attempts across the country. 
Mechanisms that foster inter party cooperation must be strengthened so 
as to improve perceptions of impartiality in oversight and scrutiny work. 
This once again could mean that all role-players need to display some 
political maturity and move above shallow party political lines and focus on 
servicing the public they represent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 90 - 
 
REFERENCES   
  
Aldons, M. ‘Rating the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committee Reports: 
The Methodology’, Legislative Studies, 15(1), Spring 2000. 
 
APAC (Association for Public Accounts Committees). 2007. Survey of 
Public Accounts Practices in South Africa. Cape Town: APAC. 
 
Auditor-General of South Africa. (2009) “National and provincial audit 
outcomes for 2008/09”. A presentation made by the Auditor-General to 
Parliament on 8 October 2009.  
 
Badenhorst, C. (2007):  Research Writing: Breaking the Barriers   
Baily, C.A. (2007): A guide to qualitative field research. Thousand Oaks, 
California: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Barkan, J.D., Ademolekun, L. Zhou, Y. Laleye, M. & Ngéthe, N. 2003. 
Emerging legislatures in emerging African democracies. A summary report 
prepared for presentation at a World Bank conference on public sector in 
Africa, Johannesburg, June 2003. 
 
Brazier, A., Flinders, M. & McHugh, D.2005.New Politics, New Parliament? 
A review of parliamentary modernisation since 1997.London: Hansard 
Society. 
 
Brazier, A. & Ram V. 2006. The fiscal maze: Parliament, government and 
public money. London: The Hansard Society. 
 
Brugge, K.U. (2006), Oversight guide for committee support staff of 
provincial legislatures in SA. Compiled for the Committee Support Staff 
Forum 
 
- 91 - 
 
 
Brugge, K.U. (2007). 3 Action Plans: COJ Section 79 Oversight 
Committees: DPUM; Safety and SCOPA. 
 
Brugge, K.U. (2008) PEBA Pocket-guide (draft). Johannesburg: GPL 
Borzel, T. A. (1998): ‘Organisation Babylon: On the different conceptions 
of policy networks.’ Public Administration. Vol. 76: 253-273. 
 
Calland, R. (1999): The First Five Years: A Review of South Africa’s 
Democratic Parliament. 
 
Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees (CCPAC) 1989. 
Guidelines for Public Accounts Committees in Canada [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ccpac.ca/docs/Guidelines-1989.pdf [2009, 10 August].  
 
Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation (CCAF) 2006. 
Parliamentary oversight – committees and relationships: A guide to 
strengthening public accounts committees. A series of guidelines 
published by the CCAF-FCVI. Ottawa: CCAF. 
 
Corder, H., Jagwanth, S., and Soltau, F. (July 1999). Report on 
parliamentary oversight and accountability. Cape Town: Faculty of Law, 
UCT. 
 
COJ (2007/8). Institutional development annual report, Progress of the  
COJ governance model. 
 
COJ’s Mayoral Committee Report (2006): The proposed high level 
legislative structure of the City of Johannesburg; Unpublished. 
 
COJ (2006/11).GDS and IDP 
 
- 92 - 
 
 
COJ Council Legislature. Institutional development project, April/May 
2008. 
 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 2004. Regional Seminar for 
Caribbean Parliamentarians: The Budgetary Cycle, Oversight and Public 
Accounts Committees - Informal Recommendations for Future Action, Port 
of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, 5-8 July 2004. 
 
Creswell, J. W. (1994) Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. London: SAGE Publications. 
 
Creswell, J. W., Fetters, M.D. and Ivankova. N. V. Designing a mixed 
methods study in primary care. Ann Farm Med. 2004, Vol. 2 No.7. 
 
De Coning, C. and Cloete, F. (2002) Theories and Models for Analysing 
Public Policy in Cloete, F and Wissink, H (ed) Improving Public Policy. 
Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
 
Foddy, W. 1993. Constructing questions for interviews and questionnaires: 
Theory and practice in social research. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Gerring, J. 2007. Case study research: Principles and practices. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gauteng Department of Local Government (2005): Local Government 
Performance Review of the Developmental Local Government Period from 
2000- 2005; Unpublished. Johannesburg: GDLG. 
 
Gauteng Department of Local Government (2008): Evaluation study on the 
implementation of the municipal public accounts committees (MPACs) in 
- 93 - 
 
the Gauteng Province. Johannesburg: GDLG. 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature (2003). Ad-hoc Committee on Ministerial 
Accountability. Final Report. Adopted as a discussion document by the 
Legislature. Johannesburg: GPL. 
 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature (2002). PEBA Oversight paradigm. 
Johannesburg: GPL. 
 
Govender, P. 2008. Report of the independent panel assessment of 
Parliament. Cape Town: Clerk of the Papers, Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
 
Gutto, S., Soncga, R. and Mothoagae, M.2007. A Study on Enhancing the 
Status, Role, Image and Positioning of the Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa. University of South Africa: Pretoria 
 
Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (ed) (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: 
Understanding Governance in the Network Society. United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hakim, C. 2000. Research design: Successful designs for social and 
economic research. Routledge: London 
 
Ham, C. and Hill, M. (1993) The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist 
State. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
 
Hedger, E. & Blick, A. 2008. Enhancing accountability for the use of public 
sector resources: How to improve the effectiveness of Public Accounts 
Committees. A background paper produced for the 20th Commonwealth 
Auditors-General Conference held in Bermuda in July 2008.  
 
- 94 - 
 
Hesse-Biber Leavey, S.N. & Leavy, P. 2006. The practice of qualitative 
research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.  
Hill, M. and Hupe, P. (2005) Implementing Public Policy: Governance in 
Theory and in Practice. London: SAGE Publications. 
 
House of Commons. 2007. Financial scrutiny uncovered: How the House 
of Commons. 2008. Parliament and Government Finance: Recreating 
Financial Scrutiny. Second Report of Session 2007–08, HC 426. London: 
The Stationery Office Limited. 
 
Howlett, M. (2002) “Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure 
to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from four Canadian Policy Sectors 1990-
2000”. Canadian Journal of Political Science 25(2), 235-267. 
 
Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2003) ‘Collaborative policymaking: 
governance through dialogue in Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (eds) 
Deliberative policy analysis: Understanding governance in the network 
society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 33-59. 
 
Institute on Governance (IoG). 2006. Forum on Municipal Governance and 
Accountability: A Summary Report. June 15, 2006. Ottawa[Online]. 
Available:http://www.iog.ca/view_publication.asp?publicationItemID=44 
[2009, 12 September]. 
 
Klijn, E. R. and Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2006) Public Management and Policy 
Networks: Foundations of a Network Approach to Governance in Budd, L., 
Charlesworth, J. and Paton, R. (ed) ‘Making Policy Happen’. London: 
Routlegde. 
 
Laffer, M. (1986) Professionalism and Policy: The role of the professions 
in the centre: Local Government Relations. Aldershot: Gower. 
 
- 95 - 
 
Leedy, P. D. and Ormrod, J. E. (1985). Practical Research: Planning and 
Design. Prentice Hall: Pearson Education International. 
Linoff, G. S. (2000) Mastering data mining. New York. Wiley. 
 
Loney, P. 2008. Critical success factors for public accounts committees. 
Proceedings of the 2008 Annual conference of the Association of Public 
Accounts Committees. Johannesburg, 6 October 2008. 
 
Loney, P. 2009. Informal discussion on the influence of public accounts 
committees. Proceedings of the 2009 Annual conference of the 
Association of Public Accounts Committees. Cape Town, 30 September 
2009. 
 
Longley, L.D. & Davidson, R.H. 1998. Parliamentary Committees: 
Changing Perspectives on Changing Institutions, in L.D. Longley & R.H. 
Davidson (eds) The new roles of parliamentary committees. London: 
Frank Cass. 
 
John, P. (2005) Analysing Public Policy. London: Continuum. 
May, P. J. (2002) Policy Design and Implementation in Peters, B. G. and 
Pierre, J. (ed) Handbook of Public Administration. London: SAGE 
Publications, 223-233. 
 
McMillan, J. H. and Schumacker, S. (2006). Research in Education: 
Evidence Based Enquiry (6th ed.). New York: Pearson Education Inc  
 
Mouton, J. 2005. How to succeed in your master’s and doctoral studies: A 
South African guide and resource book. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
Mouton, J. (1996). Understanding Social research. Pretoria: Van Schaik 
Publishers. 
 
Murray, C. & Nijzink, L. (2002). Building representative democracy. South 
- 96 - 
 
Africa’s Legislatures and the Constitution. Cape Town: Parliamentary 
Support Program. 
 
Muyangwa, M. M. and Imenda, S. N. (1996) Introduction to research in 
Education & Behavioural Sciences. Eastern Cape: University of Transkei. 
 
National Treasury (October, 2000). Guide for Accounting Officers: Public 
Finance Management Act. 
 
National Treasury (2005). Guidelines for Legislative Oversight through 
Annual Reports. 
 
Ngozwana, N. 2009. Survey of Public Accounts Committees in 
SADCOPAC Member States. Dar es Salaam: SADCOPAC. 
 
Nhleko, N. 2005 Oversight and Accountability: Statement of Definition. 
 
Neuman, W. L. 2006 Social Research Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative approaches, Whitewater: University of Wisconsin. 
 
OAG BC - Office of the Auditor-General of British Columbia. 2006. 
Parliament of the RSA. 2009. Oversight and accountability model: 
Asserting Parliament’s oversight role in enhancing democracy. Cape 
Town: Clerk of the Papers, Parliament.  
 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2009. Report of the 
independent panel assessment of Parliament. Cape Town: Clerk of the 
Papers, Parliament.  
 
Pauw, J.C., Woods, G., Van der Linde, G.J.A., Fourie, D. & Visser, C.B. 
2002. Managing Public Money: A system from the South. Sandown: 
Heinemann. 
- 97 - 
 
 
Parsons, W. 1996. Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and 
Practice of Policy Analysis. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
Pelizzo, R. & Stapenhurst, R. 2006. Public Accounts Committees, 
Singapore Management University Social Sciences & Humanities working 
paper series, Paper No. 01-2006. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1991) Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. and Marsh, D. 1992. ‘New directions in the study of 
policy networks.’ European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 21: 181-
205. 
 
SCOPA (Standing Committee on Public Accounts, National Assembly, 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa). 2003. Guidelines for 
Accounting Officers, Ministers and other persons appearing before the 
committee. Cape Town: Clerk of the Papers, Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
 
Shah, A. 2007. Local budgeting. Washington: The World Bank.  
 
Schick, A. 1990. Budgeting for results: Recent developments in five 
industrialised countries, in D.J. Savoie (ed.). 1996. Budgeting and the 
Management of Public Spending. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Scharpf, F. W. 1997. Games Real Actors Play: Actor Centred 
Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Shiceka, S. 2009. The need for public accounts committees at 
municipalities. Presentation to the 11th Annual Conference of APAC. 29 
- 98 - 
 
September 2009. Cape Town. 
 
Skocpol, T. 1993. ‘Bringing the state back in’. in Hill, M. (ed) The policy 
process: A reader. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
 
Smith, M. J. 1993. Pressure, Power and Policy. Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester /Wheatsheaf.  
 
Stapenhurst, R., Sahgal, V., Woodley, W. & Pelizzo, R. 2005. Scrutinising 
public expenditures: Assessing the performance of Public Accounts 
Committees. World Bank Policy Research Paper Working Paper 3613. 
May 2005 [Online]. Available: http://econ.worldbank.org [2009, 5 June]. 
 
Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. 1998. Mixed Methodology: combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. California: SAGE Publications. 
 
Thomson, G. J., Levacic, R and Mitchell, J. (eds). 1991. Markets, 
Hierarchies and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life, London: 
Sage/Open University Press. 
 
Van der Wal, R.W.E. (2004) Research Methodology. Rooderport: Thusa –
Help Publishers 
 
Van der Walt, C. 2007. The statutory and regulatory framework for local 
government, in Municipal management: Serving the people, 47-66. Cape 
Town: Juta. 
 
Wayne, P. 1996 Public Policy: An Introduction to the theory and practice of 
policy analysis, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
- 99 - 
 
Wehner, J. 2003. Principles and patterns of financial scrutiny: Public 
Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth. Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 41(3):21-32.  
 
Welman, C., Kruger, F. and Mitchell, B. 2005. Research Methodology. 
Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Willing, C. 2008. Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: 
Adventures in Theory and Method. McGraw Hill: Open University Press. 
 
Willis, G.B. 2005. Cognitive interviewing: A tool for improving 
questionnaire design. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.  
 
Witten, I. H. and Frank, E. 2000. Data mining. New York. Morgan-
Kaufmann.   
 
Yamamoto, H. 2007. Tools for parliamentary oversight: A comparative 
study of 88 national parliaments. Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-parliamentary 
union. 
 
Yin, K. R. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
 
INTERNET MATERIAL 
 
Audit Commission. 2002. To whom much is given. Wetherby, UK: Audit 
Commission Publications [Online] Available:  http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/nationalstudies/localgov/Pages/towhommuchisgiven.a
spx  [2009, 10 August] 
 
- 100 - 
 
Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees (CCPAC) 1991. 
Comparative Jurisdictional Implementation Survey [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ccpac.ca/jurisdic/ [2009, 10 August].  
 
Government manages its finances and how Parliament scrutinises them. A 
guide for Members by the Committee Office Scrutiny Unit, House of 
Commons: London [Online] 
http://www.parliament.uk./about_commons/house_of_commons_scrutiny_
unit.cfm [2009, 9 July]. 
 
Ostrom, 1990 Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
PCC/WBI (Parliamentary Centre Canada, and the World Bank Institute). 
2007. Parliamentary Accountability and Good Governance: A 
Parliamentarian’s Handbook. Parliamentary Centre: Ottawa [Online]. 
Available: http://www.parlcent.ca/publications/pdf/sourcebooktext.pdf   
[2009, 5 June]. 
 
Pelizzo, R. & Stapenhurst, R. 2004. Tools for legislative oversight: An 
empirical investigation. World Bank Policy Research Paper Working Paper 
3388. September 2004 [Online] Available: http://econ.worldbank.org 
[2009, 5 June]. 
 
Schacter, M. 2000. When Accountability Fails: A Framework for Diagnosis 
and Action. Institute on Governance, Policy Brief No. 9 of May 2000. 
Ottawa: Canada [Online] Available: 
http://www.iog.ca/view_publicationItemID=44 [2009, 29 July].  
 
Snape, S. & Leach, S. 2002. The Development of Overview and Scrutiny 
in Local Government. Report produced for the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister: London [Online]. Available: 
- 101 - 
 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgoernment/pdf/133640.pdf 
[2009, 12 September]. 
 
Strengthening Public Accountability: A journey on a road that never ends 
[Online]. Available: www.bcauditor.com  [2009, 4 May]. 
 
 
LEGISLATION REVIEWED 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
Local Government: White Paper on Local Government, 9 March 1998. 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998. 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000. 
Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003. 
Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office. 2000. Local Government Act. London: 
HMSO. 
Powers, Privileges, Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures 
Act, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 102 - 
 
Addendum A: Interview Guide 
Name: 
Current position: 
Date of joining the municipality: 
Previous role/position: 
 What is your understanding of the role of the committee, the 
chairperson and members of the committee? 
 What are some challenges that you have faced in conducting 
oversight work? 
 What resources, facilities, or other support would be beneficial to 
the oversight function? 
 Can you describe some examples of committee work that you were 
involved with that you feel could have been more effective and how 
it have been improved? 
 What do you see as some of the positive aspects of the committee 
system as it is currently operating? 
 What are some improvements that you think could be made in 
terms of how the new oversight function operates which would 
improve the effectiveness and impact of the committees? 
 How clear are councillors on what kinds of issues oversight 
committees should deal with? 
 Has the community or community representative bodies been 
involved in your work, if so how? 
 Overall, would you say that you feel that oversight function is 
making a positive contribution to the work of the Municipal Council, 
and how would you describe that contribution? 
 What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of the oversight 
function that you have observed? 
 Have the changes to the system given you effective leverage in 
conducting oversight? Please explain. 
- 103 - 
 
 Has there been real empowerment to chairpersons in their 
relationship between the executive? Explain. 
 Has the oversight function had an impact on the relationship 
between the Executive and the Council? 
 How would you describe the relationship between the Executive 
and the Council? 
 What are some of the lessons which you have learnt from your 
experience in oversight function? 
 What recommendations would you make as to how the oversight 
function and the operations of the system could be improved? 
 
